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INTRODUCTION
Would you agree to allow your physician to give the state health
department any of the following information about you personally or
your children?









A contagious disease, such as tuberculosis, gonorrhea, or HIV
A chronic disease, such as a cancer, asthma, or lupus
Blood sugar levels
Prescriptions for controlled substances
Immunizations
A newborn child’s genetic anomaly
The cost of medical care
The outcome of medical treatment

The answer may be “it depends.” Many people may not care at all
1
whether the state has any or all of their medical information. For
others, the answer depends on why the state needs specific infor2
mation and what it does with that information. State health and social service departments routinely collect health information in all
these categories from physicians, hospitals, laboratories, and pharma3
cies pursuant to various state reporting laws. They may also give the
information, with or without personal identifiers, to federal and international agencies and private researchers. Few of these laws require individual consent to either the collection or the uses of a person’s information. Should consent be required for any of these laws?
What health information should be freely accessible to government
and what should not?
These questions arise in the context of competing trends in the
age of Big Data: the increasing social and commercial value of health
4
information, and rising concerns about the loss of privacy in the
1

2
3
4

See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs
in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 112–14 (2012) (summarizing varying public opinion poll results); see also Americans Trust Physicians, Not Government, with
Medical Info, AHC MEDIA (Oct. 1, 1997), http://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/35862americans-trust-physicians-not-government-with-medical-info (finding that two-thirds of
poll respondents would prefer that their physicians and not the government, insurance
companies, or employers have access to their medical information).
See infra text accompanying notes 353–55.
See infra Part II.
See, e.g., M. Rose Gasner et al., Legal and Policy Barriers to Sharing Data Between Public Health
Programs in New York City: A Case Study, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 993, 996–97 (2014) (encouraging changes in laws to permit identifiable data sharing among health departments,
social service programs, health care facilities, and other agencies); Christopher Rees, Tomorrow’s Privacy: Personal Information as Property, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 220, 220–21
(2013); Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Health Research Bill Would Alter HIPAA, GOVINFO
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wake of Edward Snowden’s revelation of the National Security Agen5
cy’s (“NSA”) bulk data collection. Furthermore, recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions hint that information held by third parties
may warrant some Fourth Amendment protection in the rapidly
6
evolving age of cloud computing. Such judicial hints have encouraged critics of the third-party doctrine to argue that the Fourth
Amendment does not give government entirely free rein to obtain information about a person simply because the information is in the
7
hands of a third party. The cases may also inspire a reassessment of
whether and how other Amendments might protect personal health
8
information.

5

6

7

8

SECURITY (May 11, 2015), http://www.govinfosecurity.com/health-research-bill-wouldalter-hipaa-a-8214/op-1 (describing privacy concerns about a proposed federal bill, that
would allow covered entities to use patients’ protected health information for research
without patient consent). But see The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet: President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative (Jan. 30, 2015), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/30/fact-sheet-president-obama-sprecision-medicine-initiative (proposing NIH cancer research program with at least a million volunteers who contribute their medical records, profiles of genes, metabolites, and
microorganisms, environmental and lifestyle data, their own patient-generated information, and personal device and sensor data).
See, e.g., PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 142–43 (Jan. 23,
2014) (noting NSA’s arguments that bulk data collection allows instantaneous data retrieval, comparison with historical records, and breadth of relationships with contacts);
Spencer Ackerman, Privacy Experts Question Obama’s Plan for New Agency to Counter Cyber
Threats, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2015), www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/10/
obama-cyber-threat-agency-privacy; Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013),
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data; Edward Snowden, THE
GUARDIAN, www.theguardian.com/us-news/edward-snowden (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
See Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451 (2015) (finding that a city ordinance requiring hotel operators to maintain hotel guest records for inspection on demand by police facially violates Fourth Amendment “because it fails to provide hotel operators with
an opportunity for precompliance review”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493
(2014) (“Privacy comes at a cost.”); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties.”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (asking “what limits
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy” under the Fourth Amendment).
See generally Alan Butler, Get a Warrant: The Supreme Court’s New Course for Digital Privacy
Rights After Riley v. California, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 83 (2015) (describing
Riley’s possible effect on future Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions involving
new technologies).
For analyses of First Amendment implications, see generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR
PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE (2011); Anita L. Allen, First Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Change, 14 J. CONST. L. 885 (2012); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
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This Article encourages that reassessment. Part I describes the
types of questions that deserve fresh constitutional analysis. Part II
summarizes a variety of purposes for which health information is being collected and used today. Part III analyzes the third-party doctrine exception to the application of the Fourth Amendment, which
permits the government to obtain information from a third party
without the data subject’s consent. It concludes that, when closely
analyzed, the relevant third-party doctrine cases do not offer useful
precedents for evaluating mandatory reporting laws. The administrative search exception and the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement of probable cause or individualized suspicion are examined in Parts IV and V, respectively. Like the thirdparty doctrine examples, these cases offer limited guidance for determining whether government has the power to enact the range of
mandatory reporting laws contemplated for contemporary civil purposes. Part VI analyzes Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protection
of health information privacy as an aspect of liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause, again finding only partially applicable precedent.
Three conclusions are drawn from this review. The first is that
traditional interpretations offer meager constitutional protection for
health information privacy. A second conclusion is that traditional
interpretations of constitutional doctrine no longer adequately account for either the range of expectations of privacy in health information or the circumstances in which such information should be
9
more or less widely available. Third, as argued in Part VII, there is
room for a more sophisticated approach to constitutional protection
of health information. Such an approach should recognize current
and future dependence on sharing personal information electronically with public and private entities, as well as the dignitary aspect of
health information privacy. It should also move from a blanket, bimodal doctrinal model in which the Fourth Amendment, for example, does or does not apply, to a more individualized, purposeoriented approach, one that increases the level of judicial scrutiny in

9

Reconciling Privacy and Speech in the Era of Big Data: A Comparative Legal Analysis, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1279 (2015).
See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 378–97 (2015) (describing ways in which uses of data in cyberspace challenge legal doctrines); David G. Delaney,
Widening the Aperture on Fourth Amendment Interests: A Comment on Orin Kerr’s The Fourth
Amendment and the Global Internet, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 12 (May 18, 2015) (arguing that governments should look beyond traditional doctrines derived from law enforcement cases to “to establish suitable search-and-seizure frameworks that match society’s dependence on cyberspace”).
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inverse proportion to the immediacy of the need for the information
10
to respond to existing threats to health or safety.
I. FRAMING THE QUESTIONS
11

Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and
12
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)
recognize privacy as a human right. Numerous international and re13
gional conventions also contain privacy protections. In December
2013, amid concerns that surveillance adversely affects human rights,
the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/167
calling on states to protect privacy both offline and online and emphasizing that “international human rights law provides the universal
framework against which any interference in individual privacy rights

10

11

12

13

For example, Professor Daniel J. Solove recommends abandoning the reasonable expectations of privacy concept in Fourth Amendment doctrine in favor of requiring regulation and oversight “whenever a particular government information gathering activity creates problems of reasonable significance.” Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism,
51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (2010).
Adopted and proclaimed by G.A. Res. 217(A) (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Article 12: No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”).
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by G.A. Res. 2200(A) (XXI)
(Dec. 16, 1966) (“Article 17: 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks upon
his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.”). The United States ratified the ICCPR. United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (adopted by the United States June 8, 1992).
See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Status of the International Covenants on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984); Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action (1993), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) (adopted by the World
Conference on Human Rights, June 25, 1993); European Convention on Human Rights
art. 8, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.”); Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 16B, Dec. 17,
2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 51 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning them.”); G.A. Res. 45/158 art. 14, Convention on Migrant Workers (Dec. 18,
1990); G.A. Res. 44/25 art. 16, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989);
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art. 10; American Convention on
Human Rights, Art. 11; Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa,
Art. 4; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Art. 5; Arab Charter on
Human Rights, Art. 17; ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Art. 21; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 8; Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Free Expression and Access to Information; Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality.
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must be assessed.” 14 Pursuant to the Resolution, the High Commissioner for Human Rights prepared a report on the right to privacy in
15
the digital age. The High Commissioner’s Report, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, was requested primarily in response to antiterrorism surveillance by the NSA and other nations’ security agen16
The High
cies, but its principles are applicable more generally.
Commissioner noted that digital surveillance practices can negatively
affect other human rights, such as the human right to health, “for example where an individual refrains from seeking or communicating
sensitive health-related information for fear that his or her anonymity
17
may be compromised.” The Report questions “the extent to which
consumers are truly aware of what data they are sharing, how and
18
with whom, and to what use they will be put.”
The Report summarizes basic principles governing the human
right to privacy. First, “surveillance measures must not arbitrarily or
unlawfully interfere with an individual’s privacy, family, home or cor19
respondence.” The Human Rights Committee interprets the prohibition against arbitrary or unlawful measures to mean that even laws
that are properly enacted can be “arbitrary” if they contravene provisions, aims or objectives of the ICCPR or are unreasonable in the par20
ticular circumstances. More specifically, to be reasonable and not
arbitrary, “any interference with privacy must be proportional to the
end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given
21
case.” To be necessary, an intrusion on privacy must be “the least
22
intrusive option available.” These three concepts—legality, necessity, and proportionality—form the core principles of privacy protection in the human rights framework. They can be seen in many in14

15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy
in the Digital Age, at para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter
OHCHR, Right to Privacy]; see also G.A. Res. 68/167, The Right to Privacy in the Digital
Age (Dec. 18, 2013).
G.A. Res. 68/167, supra note 14, at 3.
OHCHR, Right to Privacy, supra note 14, at para. 3. The Report was presented to the
U.N. General Assembly on September 14, 2014, and the General Assembly is to follow it
up in the future.
Id. at para. 14.
Id. at para. 18.
Id. at para. 15.
Id. at para. 21; see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16 (Twenty-third session, 1988), COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 21 (1994),
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&Tre
atyID=8&DocTypeID=11.
OHCHR, Right to Privacy, supra note 14, at para. 21.
Id. at para. 23.
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ternational and regional documents, the European Data Directive,
23
and in the various versions of Fair Information Practices principles.
These and other guidelines limit both public and private data collec24
tion to the minimum necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose.
The United States Supreme Court is not in the habit of relying on
25
international conventions to interpret constitutional provisions.
Nonetheless, one might hear echoes of these principles in Chief Justice John Roberts’ approach to evaluating whether police need a warrant to search the cell phone contents of an arrestee in Riley v. California: “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it
26
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”
Ira Rubenstein notes that Big Data “challenges international privacy
laws in several ways: it casts doubt on the distinction between personal and non-personal data, clashes with data minimization, and un27
dermines informed choice.” As the Supreme Court is beginning to
recognize, Big Data challenges U.S. laws on privacy in the same ways.
Health information offers a paradigmatic candidate for exploring
whether and when U.S. constitutional law should protect privacy. Information about a person’s health can be viewed as intensely personal and private, access to which the person has a moral and perhaps
28
legal right to control. It can also be viewed as a valuable commodity
that society needs in order to identify criminal suspects, investigate
23
24

25
26
27
28

See Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History 3–8, 12–25 (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf.
See Maria Tzanou, Data Protection as a Fundamental Right Next to Privacy? ‘Reconstructing’ a
Not So New Right, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 88, 90 (2013) (distinguishing data protection
and data privacy under the Lisbon Treaty); International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE (May 2014),
https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text.
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE
L.J. 1151, 1155–57, 1159–60 (2004) (explaining differences in EU and U.S. privacy law).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 300 (1999)).
Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L.
74, 74 (2013).
See, e.g., EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 18 (1978); JUDITH
WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 1–2
(1997); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3–4 (1992); Edward J.
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 962, 979 (1964); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the
Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 454 (1983); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1423–24 (1974); James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value
in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 34, 54–5 (2003); Tzanou, supra note 24, at 92,
97; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195–
97 (1890).
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epidemics, calculate budgets, monitor the quality of care, develop so29
cial policy, and conduct biomedical and behavioral research. Conceptualizing the meaning of privacy of medical and health information is nearly as fraught as conceptualizing the meaning of privacy
itself, and this article will not attempt to resolve an ultimate mean30
ing. Rather, the question explored here is whether the U.S. Constitution may impose any limits on state-compelled collection or use of
identifiable personal health information for civil—non-law enforcement—purposes, and if so, when and why. Broad limits may impede
important social advances. However, if health information is not pro31
tected at all, can there be protection for other types of information?
When courts and scholars offer examples of matters that selfevidently deserve privacy protection, medical information is a prime
32
In the United States, however, information privacy in
example.
general and health information privacy in particular is subject to a
33
fragmented collection of federal and state laws. As Professor Nicolas P. Terry notes, discussions of health information privacy often
29
30

31

32

33

See Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385,
392 (2012) (noting that health data is seen “as a major source of big data”).
For a lucid summary and critique of general theories of privacy, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). Thoughtful scholarly treatments of theories of privacy
include AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT
ON PRIVACY (1971); DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1978);
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,
493 (1968); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 248
(2008); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001).
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195–217 (Alan
Sheridan trans.) (1977) (arguing that governments sought to control people by placing
under surveillance to encourage conformity with social norms); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (“The more power
the state amasses, the more Americans need constitutional guarantees to keep governments honest and devoted to the public good.”).
See e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)
(“There can be no question that an employee’s medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy
protection.”); SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 14 (“[I]f a conception of privacy were to omit
things we commonly view as private—such as medical information, intimate marital secrets, and freedom from surveillance—theorists would likely reject the conception.”);
Terry, supra note 29, at 386 (“[H]ealth information technologies (‘HIT’) and patient privacy share a long history of bipartisan support.”); Electronic Health Data Exchanges: Patient
and Consumer Principles for System Design, MARKLE FOUNDATION (Oct. 11, 2005), http: / /
www.markle.org/publications/878-electronic-health-data-exchanges-patient-andconsumer-principles-system-design (reporting wide support for patients to be able to refuse to share their health information). The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b )(6 ) (2012), speci fi cally exempts medical files from disclosure.
See WENDY K. MARINER & GEORGE J. ANNAS, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 398–401 (2014) (explaining various groundings for privacy rights); Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Systematic Government
Access to Personal Data: A Comparative Analysis, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 96, 96–97 (2014).
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conflate privacy protection with preserving the confidentiality of in34
formation already obtained, with or without a person’s permission.
Calls for mandatory reporting of more health information, for example, typically contain the puzzling caveat that its collection and use
35
should, of course, safeguard privacy. There are, however, two separate issues here. The threshold question is whether identifiable data
should be collected without consent in the first place. If not, its col36
lection is an invasion of privacy. The second is whether data that is
properly obtained will be kept confidential—that is, not disclosed to
others by the recipient. Discussions of mandatory reporting laws of37
ten proceed directly to the second question, skipping over the first.
Typically, the first question is waved away on the basis of a presumption that the state is free to compel reporting as long as it serves at
38
Thus, the concept of privacy is
least a legitimate state interest.
stripped of its normative force, leaving only procedural questions
about whether and how to keep the reported information confidential—secure against further disclosure to unauthorized persons or the
39
public at large.
This focus on confidentiality or public disclosure also fails to ask a
third or fourth question: whether the data should be used by the recipient for a different purpose than the one that justified its collection; or whether the recipient should be able to give the information
34
35

36

37
38

39

See Nicolas P. Terry, What’s Wrong with Health Privacy?, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 5–
8, 23–26 (2009).
Such comments are rarely accompanied by specific recommendations for privacy protection. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON THE RECOMMENDED SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL DOMAINS AND
MEASURES FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS, CAPTURING SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
DOMAINS AND MEASURES IN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS: PHASE 2, at 13 (2014).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (AM. LAW. INST. 1977); see also id.
§ 652A(2) (“The right of privacy is invaded by: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as
stated in § 652D; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public, as stated in § 652E.”).
See, e.g., AMY L. FAIRCHILD ET AL., SEARCHING EYES: PRIVACY, THE STATE, AND DISEASE
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 1 (2007).
See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). Some courts
have used heightened scrutiny to require an important or even compelling state interest
when the information at issue is especially sensitive, such as HIV infection or abortion.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60–61 (1976); Sheets
v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1388–89 (10th Cir. 1995); Walls v. City of Petersburg,
895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812
F.2d 105, 110, 112–13 (3d Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., The White House, Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 [hereinafter Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act], www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf.
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to third parties for new uses. Thus, there are at least four issues that
deserve exploration: (1) the justification for the initial mandatory
data collection; (2) security against further disclosure of the data
(confidentiality); (3) permissible uses of the data collected; and (4)
permissible disclosures of the data to third parties. The failure to distinguish these questions contributes to a lack of clarity surrounding
what information warrants what, if any, kind of privacy protection.
This Article asks the first question: what kinds of information
should government agencies be free to compel from third parties
who hold an individual’s personal health information? In other
words, what counts as a justifiable intrusion on privacy? This is a
question of constitutional power.
At first glance, the idea that mandatory reporting of health information might violate any constitutionally protected privacy interest or
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure seems like an outdated
notion. Judging from the volumes of articles on the topic, however,
the question of the privacy of health-related information is not entirely settled. Yet the literature focuses on statutory and regulatory re40
gimes, especially the HIPAA Privacy Rule. The constitutional dimensions of health information privacy in the civil context have
41
received little recent attention.

40

41

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”): Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (1996). See also Beverly Cohen, Regulating Data Mining Post-Sorrell: Using HIPAA to Restrict Marketing Uses of Patients’
Private Medical Information, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2012); Frank Pasquale,
Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682,
747–51 (2013); Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting Health Privacy in an Era of
Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 597, 608 (2014);
Mark A. Rothstein, HIPAA Privacy Rule 2.0, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 525, 525 (2013); Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2021
(2013) (focusing on the positive law of privacy and empirical analyses of who wins and
who loses). But see Mark A. Rothstein, Constitutional Right to Informational Health Privacy in
Critical Condition, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 280–81 (2011) (describing due process challenges to demands for personal health information).
The focus of constitutional analysis has been NSA surveillance and law enforcement
searches and seizures. See generally LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT
YOU DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (2011); JAMES P. NEHF, OPEN
BOOK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF INFORMATION PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2012); ROBERT
O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE (2005); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY:
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); JEFFREY
ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000);
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2008); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY
AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE
FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011).
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Several indicators suggest that now is an opportune time to revisit
the parameters of constitutional protection for health information.
First, with a financial push from the federal government, health information is being digitized at an increasing rate, while private sector
internet services allow individuals to upload and monitor their own
42
health information via multiple devices. All this feeds into Big Data,
where predictive analytics can be used to identify higher quality, less
costly health care and target individuals or groups for preventive or
43
remedial interventions.
Second, the excitement over Big Data’s potential to improve our
lives is tempered by concerns that information can be misused to the
44
detriment of many people, especially the disadvantaged. In this era,
government agencies, including law enforcement and national secu45
rity, can often obtain data collected by private entities. Acknowledg42

43

44

45

The HITECH Act provides financial incentives for medical providers to adopt electronic
medical records and permit data sharing. Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 226, 226–27, 230 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
HEALTH INFORMATION BLOCKING, at 4 (Apr. 2015), http:/ /www.healthit.gov/
sites/default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf; Health Datapalooza 2015 Continues
to Focus on Access to Health Data, HIMMS NEWS (June 5, 2015),
http://www.himss.org/News/NewsDetail.aspx?ItemNumber=42579;
Priyanka
Dayal
McCluskey, Partners’ $1.2b Patient Data System Seen as Key to Future, THE BOSTON GLOBE
(June 1, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/05/31/partners-launchesbillion-electronic-health-records-system/oo4nJJW2rQyfWUWQlvydkK/story.html.
See Terry, supra note 29, at 723–24, 749–50; see also Stephen Blakely, Measured Matters: The
Use of “Big Data” in Employee Benefits, NOTES, April 2015, at 11–12, 18 (describing analyses
of employee health data by employers and health insurers); Girish Navani, How Big Data
is Driving the Consumerization of Health Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 14, 2015),
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2015/08/14/how-bigdata-is-driving-the-consumerization-of-health-care (describing how wearable technology
can be linked to medical records to improve patient care).
See JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? (2013) (describing the concentration of
power among entities that control the collection and analysis of information); Frank
Pasquale, Resdescribing Health Privacy: The Importance of Information Policy, 14 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 95, 96–97 (2014) (describing potential discriminatory misuses of information). See also Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (arguing that government is more likely to use surveillance to
shape population behavior); Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and Costs, 50 DUQ. L.
REV. 271, 310–11 (2012) (describing the use of health information for wellness program
rewards and penalties).
See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1320–21
(2012) (“The FBI and other law enforcement agencies will shift from being active producers of surveillance to passive consumers, essentially outsourcing all of their surveillance activities to private third parties, ones who are not only ungoverned by the state action requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but also who have honed the ability to
convince private citizens to agree to be watched.”); see also Balkin, supra note 44, at 7
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ing such concerns, the Obama Administration proposed new statutory and regulatory measures to protect the privacy of data held by private data custodians, intensifying debate on the extent to which individuals should be able to control access to their personal infor46
information. Moreover, members of Congress recently curbed the
NSA’s bulk data collection and other federal surveillance practices in
47
order to limit privacy intrusions. Most importantly, the Supreme
Court’s recent Fourth Amendment decisions suggest that a majority
of Justices may be considering a more sophisticated approach to determining when government agencies can access digital data.
II. USES OF HEALTH INFORMATION
Health information is a valuable commodity. Properly collected
and analyzed, it has the potential to provide insights into better quali48
ty, more efficient, and less costly health services. It may also enable

46

47

48

(“[T]he line between public and private modes of surveillance and security has blurred if
not vanished. Public and private enterprises are thoroughly intertwined.”); Amitai
Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: What Is To Be Done?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 951 (2012)
(“[O]ne must assume that what is private is also public in two senses of these words: that
one’s privacy (including sensitive matters) is rapidly corroded by the private sector and
that whatever it learns is also available to the government.”); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2002)
(“[G]overnment is increasingly contracting with private sector entities to acquire databases of personal information.”).
See Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act, supra note 39; see also President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective (May
2014),
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_
data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf; Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for
Transparency and Accountability (May 2014), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commissionmay-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf; Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer
Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers (March
2012),
www.ftc.gov/reports/protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-changerecommendations-businesses-policymakers; The White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a
Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy (Feb. 2012), www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. The
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid excised information concerning substance abuse
from the claims records it opens to researchers. See Austin B. Frakt & Nicholas Bagley,
Protection or Harm? Suppressing Substance-Use Data, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1879, 1879 (2015)
(arguing that researchers’ lack of access to these files, representing about 4.5% of Medicare claims and 8% of Medicaid claims, will impede a wide range of research).
On June 2, 2015, Congress passed and the President signed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of
2015, H.R. 2048, 114th Cong. § 201 (2015).
See, e.g., Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 40, at 598; see also David W. Bates et al., Big Data in
Health Care: Using Analytics to Identify and Manage High-Risk and High-Cost Patients, 33
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1123, 1123 (2014); Matthew Herland, Taghi M. Khoshgoftaar & Randall
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individuals to access information about health concerns and the costs
of care. Health informatics specialists suggest that achieving such
goals is likely to entail integrating and analyzing data from different
sources, such as medical records, gene banks, disease registries, public health databases, and social media to study both clinical and policy
49
questions. One might add to that list the data collected by commercial entities from individuals using wearable technologies like Fitbit to
50
monitor distances walked, calories consumed, and the like. The
value of the results of such data mining and analysis, of course, depends importantly on the reliability and accuracy of the information
51
contained in the source data sets. However, the current state of
technology is not immune from introducing new errors in the pro52
cess of mining, integrating, and analyzing data.
A. Clinical Medical Care, Payment for Services, and Health Care Operations
The original and still most common functions of electronic medical records (“EMR”)—or electronic health records (“EHR”), the current, broader term—are (1) to make patient information available to
clinicians and health care workers as needed to provide care to the
53
patient, and (2) to facilitate the submission and payment of provid54
er claims for treatment services. No one disputes the need for sharing identifiable patient information for these purposes, although
there are some concerns that the shared information be limited to

49

50
51

52

53
54

Wald, A Review of Data Mining Using Big Data in Health Informatics, J. BIG DATA, June 2014,
at 22; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes Through Personalized Comparisons of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health Records, 39 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 425, 425 (2011).
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 48, at 428; see also Nigam H. Shah& Jessica D.
Tenenbaum, The Coming Age of Data-Driven Medicine: Translational Bioinformatics’ Next Frontier, 19 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N e1, e3 (2012).
Angela Daley, The Law and Ethics of ‘Self-Quantified’ Health Information: An Australian Perspective, 5 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 144 (2015) (describing such devices and their uses).
See Sharona Hoffman, Medical Big Data and Big Data Quality Problems, 21 CONN. INS. L.J.
289, 290, 304 (2015); see also Simon I. Hay, Dylan B. George, Catherine L. Moyes & John
S. Brownstein, Big Data Opportunities for Global Infectious Disease Surveillance, PLOS MED.,
Apr. 2013, at 2–3 (noting that data from social media can be unreliable or misleading).
Thomson Kuhn et al., Clinical Documentation in the 21st Century: Executive Summary of a Policy Position Paper From the American College of Physicians, 162 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 301,
308 (2015). See generally K. Krasnow Waterman & Paula J. Bruening, Big Data Analytics:
Risks and Responsibilities, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 89, 89–90 (2014).
Kuhn et al., supra note 52, at 302, 310.
The “treatment” and “payment” uses are permitted without patient authorization under
the HIPAA Privacy Rule as part of “treatment, payment or health care operations.” 45
C.F.R. § 164.506 (2002).
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only that necessary for the recipient to perform a specific function. 55
Most large hospital systems and large physician group practices have
implemented EHRs, but adoption by smaller providers has been
56
slow. A lack of interoperability among EHR systems has hindered
57
progress toward statewide, regional, and national networks. Nonetheless, EHRs are expected to become the source of data for an in58
creasing number of purposes as technology improves.
Hospitals and other health care facilities, as well as physician practice groups, typically review EHR data to analyze the cost and quality
of care they have provided to their patients. Such review can focus
on a single patient—to identify an error in diagnosis, treatment or
follow-up—or on a group of patients to determine whether a particu59
lar course of treatment has proved effective. Where the analyses are
designed to provide generalizable knowledge to improve patient care
in general, rather than to inform the reviewers’ own practices, they
could be considered health services research that requires patient
60
consent under state law.
B. State Databases
States have developed several databases of identifiable health information for both clinical and research uses. The Federal Government encourages states to create Prescription Drug Monitoring Pro-

55
56
57
58

59

60

For a history and comparison of different versions of Fair Information Practices, see
Gellman, supra note 23.
See Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic
Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 686 (2007).
See id. at 682.
See Caitlin M. Cusack et al., The Future State of Clinical Data Capture and Documentation: A
Report from AMIA’s 2011 Policy Meeting, 20 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N. 134 (2013). But
see Jennifer Bresnick, Health Information Exchange Data Scarce, Inaccurate, Incomplete,
HEALTH IT ANALYTICS (Feb. 17, 2015), http://healthitanalytics.com/news/healthinformation-exchange-data-scarce-inaccurate-incomplete (“Due to the perception of
health information exchange as unpredictable, inaccurate, incomplete, and expensive,
70% of non-system hospitals and 91% of physician practices are not routinely communicating patient data to external organizations.”).
Such reviews are encompassed under the “health care operations” uses permitted without
patient authorization under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a), 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.506.
But cf. J. Cassel & A. Young, Why We Should Not Seek Individual Informed Consent For Participation In Health Services Research, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 313, 316 (2002) (“A right to individual
informed consent, interpreted as an absolute requirement in all areas of research, militates against health care for disadvantaged minorities, since some groups will have the notional ‘right’ to health care but are not in a position to exert that right equally.”).
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grams (“PDMPs”) in an effort to reduce prescription drug abuse.61
Physicians can consult an electronic database of prescription drugs
dispensed to individuals to determine whether a patient has a legitimate medical need for the drug. PDMPs, especially those that allow
law enforcement or other government agencies access to the data,
raise Fourth Amendment questions, discussed in Part V.
The need to control health care costs generated proposals for
states to collect health insurance claims data, to analyze the cost of
62
different types of health care services and items. At least sixteen
states have enacted legislation requiring health insurance companies
to submit reports of their payments on behalf of enrollees to the state
department of health or insurance or a special agency created to collect such reports in an All Payer Data Base (“APDB”), sometimes
63
called an All Payer Claims Database (“APCD”).
More states are proposing or developing APDBs. Individuals
whose data are reported are not asked for consent and may not even
64
realize that their data is being sent to the state. Most states out65
source the operation of the APDB to an outside vendor.
An additional stated goal of APDBs is to determine the quality of
different approaches to care for medical conditions, but quality has
been subordinated to cost concerns so far, perhaps because reliable
measures of quality remain limited. To analyze quality, states may
need to track the care provided on an individualized basis in order to
61
62

63

64

65

See generally Kristin M. Finklea et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress R42593 (Jan. 3, 2013).
See Jo Porter et al., The Basics of All-Payer Claims Databases: A Primer for States, STATE
HEALTH AND VALUE STRATEGIES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.rwjf.org/en/researchpublications/find-rwjf-research/2014/01/the-basics-of-all-payer-claims-databases—aprimer-for-states.html.
If truly all payers are included, then Medicare and Veterans Affairs health services, as well
as other federal health benefit programs, need to agree to submit their claims for benefits. The Federal Government has been reasonably willing to participate, given its interest
in finding ways to control health care costs. See MD. HEALTH CARE COMM’N & CTR. FOR
ANALYSIS AND INFO. SERVS., Draft Work Plan for Expanding the Content and Use of Maryland’s
Medical Care Data Base (MCDB) to Address New Information Needs, at 2 (June 2013),
http://mhcc.maryland.gov/mhcc/pages/apcd/apcd_mcdb/documents/MCDB_Draft_
Workplan_20130601.pdf. (describing the history and operation of the Maryland Medical
Care Data Base). Third party administrators (“TPAs”) of self-funded employer-sponsored
health plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) present a different problem. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016)
(finding that ERISA preempts Vermont state requirement that ERISA plans or their TPAs
report claims).
Most health insurance policies include a standard provision that the policyholder agrees
to allow the insurer to use and disclose the person’s information for multiple purposes,
with some explicitly including research. Sample policies are on file with author.
See Porter et al., supra note 62.
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attribute outcomes to specific provider interventions. They may also
wish to observe cost of care trends associated with particular patients
or providers to impute rises or falls in cost (accounting for volume),
with or without comparing the quality of the care provided. Both uses typically require tracking individual patients and which individual
practitioners provided what type of care.
A major motivating idea behind APDBs is that states will be able to
provide consumers with price information about particular health
services, thereby enabling consumers to choose the most costeffective health plans and providers. So far, however, the data has
been used primarily for research, by the agencies and outside research organizations like universities and consulting firms, with lim66
ited information open to consumers. There is considerable enthusiasm for APDBs among research organizations, which advocate
67
making greater use of the data for multiple research purposes. Proposals include linking the APDB to other databases, such as medical
records, disease registries, vital statistics, and patient surveys.
There is no question that it would be useful to be able to identify
what types of medical care work well and which do not—and at what
price—both to improve patient care and to avoid wasting money. Doing so often requires following identifiable patients as they go from
provider to provider. Indeed, supporters of APDBs advocate releasing identifiable data sets to providers and others for such purposes.
68
The appeal of analyzing inforDatabases invite data mining.
mation already collected is almost irresistible. If one searches hard
enough, something will certainly be found. Thus, the mere existence
of a database attracts new users and uses. Some of these uses may be

66

67

68

See D.J. Wilson, New APCD Legislation Getting Broad Support, STATE OF REFORM (Jan. 30,
2015),
http://stateofreform.com/news/industry/healthcare-providers/2015/01/newapcd-legislation-getting-broad-support/ (“One of the key talking points from supporters
last year was that providing information options for consumers would help drive accountability and price reductions in the market. The new legislation makes the use of the data
primarily for research purposes by academic institutions rather than for individuals in
their health care decision making.”).
See, e.g., The Network for Excellence in Health Innovation (“NEHI”), All Payer Claims Databases: Unlocking the Potential (Dec. 2014), http://www.nehi.net/publications/62-allpayer-claims-databases-unlocking-the-potential/view (“Experts agreed that it was unlikely
for APCDs to become the go-to resource for consumer price/cost transparency information.”). NEHI’s board of directors consists of executives of health insurance companies, academic medical centers, and commercial businesses.
See generally SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (Deborah Russell ed., 1st ed. 2000); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE
(2005).
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benign, but others may not be so benign. 69 New users develop a stake
in the database. If any serious objection arises, these stakeholders often are too entrenched to support any limitation on data collection
70
or uses.
C. Public Health Surveillance
Much of the public, including privacy scholars and judges, probably are unfamiliar with modern public health surveillance programs,
perhaps assuming that such programs are limited to serious epidem71
ics of contagious disease, like Ebola or avian flu. To be sure, all
states have laws that require medical facilities, physicians, and laboratories to report diagnoses of contagious diseases that could pose a
risk of infecting the public. The list of diseases and conditions that
the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control recommend be reported has grown to sixty-nine, although not all states require all to
72
be reported. In the case of disease outbreaks, like the recent measles outbreaks, the reports help trace the cases to their source and
health practitioners can intervene to stop the spread of disease.
Investigating outbreaks and epidemics, however, is a declining
73
part of public health surveillance today. Public health now focuses
74
special attention on chronic diseases. Many states require the reporting of individuals with non-infectious chronic diseases like asthma, multiple sclerosis, and lupus, in order to study whether they
75
might be caused by environmental risks. Most states also have regis69

70
71

72

73
74
75

See, e.g., Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D. Kan. 2006) (rejecting state
Attorney General’s opinion that sexual abuse reporting statute required medical providers to report consensual sexual activity of minors to the state).
MARINER & ANNAS, supra note 33, at 432.
See, e.g., Deven McGraw, Privacy Concerns Related to Inclusion of Social and Behavioral
Determinants of Health in Electronic Medical Records, Appendix B, in IOM Report
(summarizing HIPAA’s public health exception without describing what counts as public
health).
See Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (“CDC”), 2014 National Notifiable Infectious Diseases, http: / / wwwn.cdc.gov/NNDSS/script/ConditionList.aspx? Type=0&Yr=
2014. Recommendations are developed by the CDC and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, a professional membership association of state and local epidemiologists. The National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System at the CDC collects disease
reports that are voluntarily submitted by the states. For a history of disease surveillance,
see generally FAIRCHILD ET AL, supra note 37.
Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L.
REV. 347, 350 (2007).
World Health Organization, Preventing Chronic Diseases—A Vital Investment, at 2
(2005), http://www.who.int/chp/chronic_disease_report/contents/en/.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-206(f) (2014) (requiring schools to report the number of
students with diagnosed Asthma cases, “(1) at the time of public school enrollment, (2)
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tries that collect identifiable information about persons with various
conditions, such as cancers, as well as immunization registries to
identify children who have not received all the recommended vac76
cines. All states require newborns to be screened for between six
and thirty-one genetic and congenital conditions; two states allow
77
parents to refuse the tests. Most experts agree that screening is important for at least six of these conditions, including PKU and sickle
cell, because some form of treatment is available to prevent or ame78
liorate the condition if begun in infancy. The blood test samples
and results for other conditions are retained for varying lengths of
time in what amounts to a DNA bank and are used predominantly for
79
research. In 2014, however, federal legislation recognized that studies using newborn blood samples collected in newborn screening
programs must comply with federal regulations governing research
80
with human subjects, including obtaining consent for research uses.
A more controversial example of chronic disease surveillance is
New York City’s Blood Sugar Registry. The City’s Board of Health
ordinance requires laboratories to report the results of every Hemoglobin A1c (blood sugar) test to the department of Health and Men-

76

77
78

79

80

in grade six or seven, and (3) in grade ten or eleven”); MD. CODE REGS. 11.17.03.02
(mandating licensees to report defined medical conditions including multiple sclerosis to
the Motor Vehicle Administration). Other reporting statutes may be invoked for a limited time period and geographic area. See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH CTR. FOR ENVT’L
EPIDEMIOLOGY PROGRAM, FINAL REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF SYSTEMIC
LUPUS ERYTHEMATOSUS (“SLE”) IN BOSTON AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 3–8, (2007),
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/environmental/tracking/lupus-report-web.pdf
(referring to data collected from in-patient and out-patient records from eleven major
hospitals in the Metro-Boston catchment area that were obtained by requests pursuant
statutory authority).
See National Program of Cancer Registries, 42 U.S.C. § 280e (2002) (authorizing the CDC
to provide grants for creating cancer registries to states that have certain laws in place);
IND. CODE § 16-38-2 (2004), https://iga.in.gov/legislative/laws/2014/ic/titles/016/ (establishing a cancer registry that is open for research purposes without consent unless the
researcher seeks additional information in which case they must obtain the consent of the
patient’s attending physician and the written consent of the patient).
For specific screening requirements in each state, see About Newborn Screening/Conditions Screened by State, www.babysfirsttest.org/newborn-screening/states.
See STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARA BUCHBINDER, SAVING BABIES: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
NEWBORN GENETIC SCREENING (2013) (describing how newborn screening is done in
practice); see also Leila Barraza & Lauren Burkhart, The Expansion of Newborn Screening:
Implications for Public Health and Policy, 23 ANNALS HEALTH L. 42, 45–46 (2014).
See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN USING RESIDUAL
NEWBORN SCREENING SAMPLES FOR TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH 51–54 (Steve Olson & Adam C. Berger, Rapporteurs 2010).
Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014, 42 U.S.C. § 300b-12
(amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 300b-1 et. seq.)
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tal Hygiene by name without patient consent. 81 The department
seeks the reports to identify individuals and ensure that they receive
treatment for diabetes and behavioral education, although the individuals may already be under a physician’s care, and the department
82
cannot compel anyone to accept assistance.
D. Research
The reader may have noticed a recurring theme in the above examples. A striking proportion of the uses of medical information collected is for research. Indeed, medical databases offer a cheaper al83
ternative to conducting research studies with actual human beings.
That research ranges from biomedical and epidemiological studies by
academic institutions to qualitative research on behavioral risks to
health, such as tobacco and alcohol use, weight, substance abuse, and
84
depression. The data are also studied to develop government agency budgets, employment and other social policies, and whether to re85
quire more reporting.
Many organizations encourage the collection and use of more
86
health data electronically for multiple purposes, including research.
The Institute of Medicine recommended that research using health
81

82

83
84

85

86

New York City, N.Y., 24 Health Code §§ 13.03–04 (2006). For a description and critique
of the Registry, see generally Wendy K. Mariner, Medicine and Public Health: Crossing Legal
Boundaries, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 121 (2007).
Shadi Chamany et al., Tracking Diabetes: New York City’s A1C Registry, 87(3) THE MILBANK
QTRLY. 547, 559 (2009). Note that the registry does not track diabetes; it only requires
reporting of blood sugar levels, one of several measures used to diagnose diabetes. Mariner, supra note 81, at 123.
Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1631–32
(2013).
See generally J.R. Lumpkin, History and Significance of Information Systems and Public Health, in
PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 16–38 (P.W. O’Carroll, W.A.
Yasnoff, M.E. Ward, L.H. Ripp, & E.L. Martin, eds. 2003).
See Leslie P. Francis, Patient Registries: Patient Consent When Patients Become Adults, 7 ST.
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 389 (2014); A. Nosek et al., Promoting an Open Research Culture, 348 (6242) SCIENCE 1422 (2015) (advocating increased sharing of datasets for research).
See, e.g., Committee on the Recommended Social and Behavioral Domains and Measures
for Electronic Health Records, Institute of Medicine, Capturing Social and Behavioral Domains and Measures in Electronic Health Records: Phase 2, at 5 (2014); Kuhn, supra note 52, at
7 (“The laudable goal is to be able to extract data automatically from patient records,
compile the data into reports, and export them with the click of a button. This process, if
it worked well, would be far better than the current process of manual chart abstraction;
additional data entry at the point of care; and dependency on claims data for measurement of quality, public health reporting, research, and regulatory compliance.”);
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Transforming Healthcare Through Secondary Use of Health Data
(2009), www.pwc.com/us/en/healthcare/publications/secondary-health.data.jhtml.
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information should be permitted without the individual’s consent. 87
That recommendation, criticized by some legal scholars, has not
88
gained noticeable support outside the research community. A recent report recommends that electronic health records include more
information about a patient’s social and behavioral issues to “enable
more effective responses to the pressures [affecting health] when
used by health systems, including public health officials, researchers,
89
and providers treating individual patients.” Among the elements
recommended to be noted in the medical record were stress, negative
affect such as depression or anxiety, physical activity, alcohol use, exposure to partner violence, and socioeconomic characteristics, in90
cluding neighborhood median household income.
The commercial and research value of large databases of identifiable information can attract external threats to privacy. Health information appears to be surprisingly vulnerable to hacking, theft, and
91
loss. The Department of Health and Human Services posts reports
of breaches of more than 500 medical records since 2009, required
92
The site listed more than 1,000
pursuant to the HITECH Act.

87

88

89

90
91

92

BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH
RESEARCH 42–43 (S.J. Nass, L.A. Levit & L.O. Gostin, eds. 2009) [hereinafter IOM
RESEARCH] (arguing that research with identifiable health information should not require consent, in part because obtaining consent can be difficult and costly).
See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Improve Privacy in Research by Eliminating Informed Consent?
IOM Report Misses the Mark, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 507 (2009) (challenging the IOM recommendations on empirical and ethical grounds). For similar criticisms of proposals to
use UK National Health Service data for research without patient consent, see generally
Ian Brown, Lindsey Brown & Douwe Korff, Using NHS Patient Data for Research Without
Consent, 2(2) LAW, INNOVATION & TECH. 219 (2011); Nikolaus Forgó, My Health Data—
Your Research: Some Preliminary Thoughts on Different Values in the General Data Protection Regulation, 5 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 54 (2015).
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON THE RECOMMENDED SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL DOMAINS AND MEASURES FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, CAPTURING SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL DOMAINS AND MEASURES IN ELECTRONIC
HEALTH RECORDS: PHASE 2, at 3 (2014).
Id. at 8, Table S-1.
See PONEMON INSTITUTE, FOURTH ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY OF PATIENT PRIVACY & DATA
SECURITY (Mar. 2014), www2.idexpertscorp.com/ponemon-report-on-patient-privacydata-security-incidents/; Vincent Liu et al., Data Breaches of Protected Health Information in
the United States (Research Letter), 313 J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 1471 (2015); see also
Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Office of Civil Rights, Improper Disclosure of Research
Participants’ Protected Health Information Results in $3.9 Million HIPAA Settlement (Mar. 17,
2016),
http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/03/17/improper-disclosure-researchparticipants-protected-health-information-results-in-hipaa-settlement.html#.
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201
et seq., Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226.
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breach reports as of February 2015. 93 Each report covers a breach of
94
hundreds, thousands and sometimes millions of records.
This overview should demonstrate how the uses of health information—current as well as prospective—are expanding with the
growth in technology, exacerbating tensions between privacy and Big
Data. Statutory and common law protections for patient information
95
remain patchy. While privacy advocates seek greater privacy protection, powerful public and private institutions encourage legislation to
expand their access to health information. Hence, the time is ripe to
reconsider whether there are any constitutional limits to government
collection and use of health information.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
We might begin with the presumption that the Fourth Amend96
ment does not apply when government compels an entity to produce another person’s health information. In other words, such a
search is an exception to the Fourth Amendment. Two lines of cases
93

94

95

96

Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf (last
visited Nov. 11, 2015).
For example, hackers broke into the electronic database of information about Anthem
Inc. (formerly Wellpoint) health insurance enrollees. Anthem’s stored database, which
contained eighty million unencrypted Social Security numbers of enrollees, was not encrypted, reportedly because encryption would make it harder to share enrollee information with health providers and state agencies. Danny Yadron & Melinda Beck, Health
Insurer Anthem Didn’t Encrypt Data in Theft, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:26 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/investigators-eye-china-in-anthem-hack-1423167560. Hospitals and insurers use random passwords and other mechanisms to enable authorized access to patient records in their own internal central database; but the databases themselves, where records are stored electronically, may or may not be encrypted or otherwise
unusable to hackers. Anthem, undoubtedly like some other companies, may have decided that information security was not worth the cost. Id. Whatever the reason, some companies may find sharing the information more important than safeguarding patient privacy.
Latanya Sweeney analogized legal protections for privacy in general to placing a few cloth
patches randomly on the body instead of dressing it in a whole suit of clothes. Latanya
Sweeney, Presentation, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Symposium, “What Privacy? Exploring a Constitutional Right to Information Privacy,” cosponsored by the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities, Jan. 23, 2015.
The Fourth Amendment states that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
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support this presumption. First, the third-party doctrine has effectively excised information obtained from third parties from Fourth
97
Amendment protection. The third-party doctrine presumes that information held by third parties, like hospitals and health insurers, no
longer qualifies as the person’s “papers or effects” protected by the
98
Fourth Amendment. Second, the special needs doctrine has created another exception, which has expanded to permit government in99
vasions of privacy for increasingly questionable reasons. Thus, it is
not surprising that most observers would assume that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect health information to any cognizable
100
degree.
However, neither line of cases squarely addresses the question
whether government can compel the production of personally identi101
The third-party docfiable health information for civil purposes.
trine developed in the context of criminal procedure—investigations
and prosecutions—which is the subject of most Fourth Amendment
102
Recent special needs cases have considered
scholarship.
97
98

99
100

101

102

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440
(1976).
See State v. Davis, 12 A.3d 1271, 1273 (N.H. 2010) (finding no reasonable expectation of
privacy in medical test results provided to law enforcement); People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d
310, 321 (Mich. 1990) (relying on United States v. Miller to find that patients had no possession, or ownership, or reasonable expectation of privacy in blood test results for alcohol levels that hospital turned to police in automobile accident investigation). This presumption is subject to a growing number of critiques. See United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”); Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and
Jones: The Implications of United States v. Jones—A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV.
683, 684–85 (2013); see generally Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011).
See infra Part V; see generally Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 1, at 111 (“The Supreme Court has not found
that patients have either a property right or a privacy right associated with their medical
records.”); Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1505 (2015); Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36 AM J. L. & MED. 586, 588 (2010); Edward P. Richards, Collaboration Between
Public Health and Law Enforcement: The Constitutional Challenge, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1157, 1157 (Oct. 2002), http:/ /www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no10/02-0465.
htm (“[U]nder the police power, public health officials . . . may search and seize without
probable-cause warrants.”).
Fourth Amendment challenges to government access to health information are rare. But
see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010); Doe v. Broderick, 225
F.3d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 2000); State v. Skinner, 10 So.3d 1212, 1213 (La. 2009); New York
City Health & Hospital Corp. v. Morgenthau (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 779 N.E.2d
173, 174 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Perlos, 436 N.W.2d 310, 311 (Mich. 1990).
The literature on this topic is vast. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2014); SLOBOGIN, supra note 41; Susan
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suspicionless searches for civil purposes, but such searches were bodi103
ly invasions—testing for unlawful drug use—not searches for data.
Thus, it is worth reviewing the scope and limits of these doctrines to
see whether or how they might apply to laws mandating the reporting
of health information and whether there is room for any Fourth
Amendment protection.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the Fourth
Amendment makes no textual distinction between civil and criminal
104
As Justice Byron White wrote in Camara v. Municipal
searches.
Court, “It is surely anomalous to say the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the
105
The U.S. Supreme
individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”
Court has certainly applied the Fourth Amendment in the civil con106
Thus, it cannot be assumed that the Fourth Amendment oftext.
fers no protection to personal health information solely because the
information is sought for purposes other than law enforcement.
Furthermore, demanding information directly from an individual
107
certainly qualifies as a search of the person or his papers or effects.
A compulsory reporting law would constitute a search or a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment if the requirement were directed at

103
104

105
106

107

Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us, Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 (2007); Lucas Issacharoff
& Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 987 (2016);
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009); Matthew
D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the Case for a “Crazy
Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, 11 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007); Solove, supra note
45.
But see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69 (2001). See also infra Part V.
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758 (1994)
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment applies equally to civil and criminal law enforcement.”);
Delaney, supra note 9, at 11 (“[The] Fourth Amendment . . . unquestionably regulates all
elements of federal and state government.”).
Camara v. Municipal Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 60, 67 (1992) (confirming that the Fourth
Amendment applies in the civil context and finding that police seizure of tenants’ trailer
at landlord’s request prior to eviction hearing constitutes a seizure subject to Fourth
Amendment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (“[T]his Court has never
limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police.”); Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321–24 (1978)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to administrative inspections of private
commercial property); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures regardless of how the matter taken is
used).
See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506
(2007).
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the person whose information is demanded. 108 Of course, health information is typically (although not always) held by a third party,
such as a medical provider, a laboratory, an insurer, or (these days)
109
an Internet server.
Two questions arise here. The first is whether the location of the
information makes a difference. The third-party doctrine says that it
110
does, but criticism of that conclusion is mounting. The second and
perhaps more important question is whether the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information held by a
third party. Each of these questions is discussed below.
A. The Third-Party Doctrine and Continuous Reporting
For decades, the third-party doctrine has operated to close the
courts to claims that information provided to government by a third
party violates the Fourth Amendment—primarily in the criminal con111
The doctrine’s origins are attributed to United States v. Miller,
text.
in which federal Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) agents issued a subpoena duces tecum to a bank to obtain Miller’s bank records,
112
and the bank turned over the records. The ATF was conducting a
criminal investigation into suspected tax fraud by Miller, who allegedly owned an unregistered still and failed to pay whiskey taxes. The

108

109

110
111
112

Hayden, 387 U.S. at 301–02 (stating that Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures regardless of how the matter taken is used). Whether such a search would be reasonable without consent, a warrant, or a court order is a separate issue.
See generally Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531
(2005) (discussing whether electronic searches of computer data should be deemed
searches or seizures); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“A
‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”). Many people are
keeping their own personal health records separately, such that health care providers are
no longer the sole record keepers of health data. See ERIC TOPOL, THE PATIENT WILL SEE
YOU NOW (2015) (arguing, optimistically, that a new era of mobile devices should enable
individuals to perform their own diagnostic tests). Some health records compiled by individuals for themselves, however, may be stored in the cloud in a personal account or
through a commercial provider of health monitoring services—who might or might not
also be considered third parties—and an individual might have several such electronic
storage sites. See Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs and Risks to
Consumers?, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 216 (2009) (comparing electronic health eecords to personal health records).
See generally SLOBOGIN, supra note 41; Freiwald, supra note 102; Henderson, supra note 98;
Lawless, supra note 102.
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–38 (1976).
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Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment did not protect
bank records from disclosure pursuant to a grand jury subpoena:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
113
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.

In Miller, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in checks, which were “not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transac114
tions.”
Since Miller, it has been generally presumed that a person who
voluntarily discloses information to a third party, like a bank or an internet service provider, knowing that the third party would use that
information in its regular business, abandons his or her expectation
of privacy in that information and thus, any Fourth Amendment protection against government access to the information.
Smith v. Maryland strengthened that assumption when it upheld
the installation of a pen register at a telephone company’s central office to monitor the telephone numbers dialed by a man suspected of
115
making threatening and obscene calls to a robbery victim. The telephone company acted on a request by police, who had no warrant
116
or court order. This warrantless search provided the evidence for a
warrant to search Smith’s home, where more evidence led to Smith’s
117
arrest and conviction for the robbery.
The Supreme Court gave several reasons for finding that the
Fourth Amendment posed no bar to the telephone company’s compliance with the police request. First, the Court distinguished the
pen register from the listening device attached to a public phone
118
booth, which was at issue in Katz, on the ground that the pen register recorded only numbers dialed and not any communication, spo119
Second, it doubted whether “people in
ken words, or content.
113
114
115
116
117
118

119

Id. at 443.
Id. at 442.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
Id.
Id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368
(1968) (adopting Justice John M. Harlan’s concept of reasonable expectation of privacy
from his concurrence in Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (“Neither the purport of any communication between the caller
and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is
disclosed by pen registers.” (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167
(1977))).
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general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers
120
they dial.” Third, it noted that telephone companies routinely used
121
pen registers for billing and other regular business purposes. Finally, the Court concluded that it “consistently has held that a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
122
turns over to third parties.”
Miller and Smith suggest that a patient who voluntarily gives personal information to a health care provider has no Fourth Amendment claim against any action by government to obtain that information from the provider. After all, the patient has voluntarily
provided the information, and the provider is using it in the course
of business—treating the patient and billing for treatment.
A closer look at the third-party doctrine line of cases, however, reveals that they rely on facts that differ from mandatory reporting laws
in several important respects. First, the third-party doctrine developed in cases involving targeted criminal investigations; that is, law
enforcement sought to obtain information about a person suspected
123
124
of a criminal offense or to identify the perpetrator of a crime. In
contrast, government agencies, such as health departments, seek
mandatory reporting laws to collect health information for civil pur125
poses. Civil reporting laws require information about a population,
none of whose members are suspected of any criminal offense. Second, the criminal cases involved one-off investigations, whereas reporting laws authorize data collection on an on-going basis.
Third, most third-party doctrine cases concerned information
provided more or less voluntarily by the third party to law enforce126
In contrast, mandatory reporting laws directly compel the
ment.

120
121
122

123
124
125

126

Id. at 742.
Id.
Id. at 743–44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963)).
White, 401 U.S. at 746–47 (false friends); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 297–300 (same).
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737–38.
See supra Part II. Some civil purposes would justify mandatory reporting, just as people
may have no reasonable expectation of privacy in some of their information; these issues
are taken up in Part VII.
To be sure, entities providing information in response to a subpoena, as in Miller, might
not feel that production is truly voluntary, even if they are able to contest the subpoena.
And federal law required the bank in Miller to maintain the records in the first place, further diluting the meaning of “voluntary” in that case.
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third party to turn data over to government. 127 Thus, mandatory reporting laws can be seen as government-compelled, continuous,
suspicionless searches of an entire population’s data, which Miller and
128
its progeny never considered. This looks like a contemporary analogy to the general warrant that the Founders crafted the Fourth
Amendment to prevent, with the search conducted digitally rather
129
than physically in the home.
The NSA’s bulk collection of data offers a contemporary analogy
in the criminal context. The NSA relied on Smith to support the constitutionality of its program, but the legality, as well as the wisdom, of
130
that program remains highly controversial. If Smith is ultimately determined to not to justify bulk data collection for purposes of investigating terrorism, the third-party doctrine may prove to be fragile
131
support for bulk data collection for civil purposes, too.
There is a striking similarity between civil surveillance programs
and the NSA’s bulk collection program. Both § 215 of the Patriot Act
and most mandatory reporting laws require the ongoing suspicionless
132
Yet one federal circuit
collection of data for future data mining.
court of appeals found the NSA’s program was not authorized by the

127
128

129

130

131

132

See Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families, 772 F.3d 1352, 1376 (11th Cir.
2014).
Miller, 425 U.S. at 444–45 n.6 (“There was no blanket reporting requirement of the sort
we addressed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–84 (1976). . . . We are not confronted with
a situation in which the Government, through ‘unreviewed executive discretion,’ has
made a wide-ranging inquiry that unnecessarily ‘[touch]es upon intimate areas of an individual’s personal affairs.’ California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (Powell,
J., concurring). Here the Government has exercised its powers through narrowly directed subpoenas duces tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such process.” (alteration in original)).
See TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE
FIGHT
AGAINST
TERRORISM
49
(2004),
www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/
20040300tapac.pdf (“If conducted without an adequate predicate, [data mining] has the
potential to be a twenty-first century equivalent of general searches, which the authors of
the Bill of Rights were so concerned to protect against.”); see also Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (noting that the Fourth Amendment prohibits general warrants,
whereby government conducts “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings”).
See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding § 215 of the Patriot Act
does not authorize the bulk metadata collection program); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that § 215 probably violates the Fourth Amendment).
See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 847 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting “whether the analytical
framework, much less the rationale” of Smith applies to modern technologies “is questionable and far from clearly established”).
See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 795–97 (noting also the requirement that the data be kept confidential within the agency and not released except in accordance with strict policies).
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Act. 133 Of particular interest is that court’s discussion of what is “rele134
vant” to an investigation. The court concluded that the word “relevant” in § 215 referred only to a particular investigation, not to the
ongoing collection of all metadata just in case it might prove useful in
135
the future. It found that “such an expansive concept of ‘relevance’
136
is unprecedented and unwarranted.”
Mandatory health data reporting laws are based on a similarly expansive concept of relevance. Substitute “medical research” for
“criminal investigation,” and the court’s explanation could describe
many health surveillance programs. For example, newborn screening
databases are used primarily for research, and APDBs are used to analyze whether various approaches to health care are cost-effective. In
some states, law enforcement can access PDMPs to obtain data about
137
Ironically, the NSA colpossible illegal drug users or prescribers.
lects less specific information about individuals than do health surveillance programs. The NSA collected metadata—only telephone
138
numbers and email addresses—not the content of calls or emails.
Surveillance programs collect names, addresses, test results, and a
139
host of other details.
Might ACLU v. Clapper suggest that civil surveillance programs are
at risk? The relevance of the concept of “relevance” in civil surveillance programs lies in the justification for the initial data collection
(question one above). Data are sought for a reason. Usually data are
said to be “needed” for a particular purpose, such as investigating the
140
source of an outbreak. For databases like PDMPs and ACDBs, how133
134

135

136
137
138

139
140

Id. at 792.
Under the Patriot Act, the government may apply for an order requiring the production
of any “tangible things” if it has reasonable grounds to believe that such things “are relevant to an authorized investigation,” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A), “to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,” id. § 1861(a)(1). The scope of
the application is the same as that of a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court for a grand
jury investigation. Id. § 1861(c)(2)(D).
Clapper, 785 F.3d at 815 (finding that the text of § 215 did not permit sweeping up “a vast
trove of records of metadata concerning the financial transactions or telephone calls of
ordinary Americans to be held in reserve in a data bank, to be searched if and when at
some hypothetical future time the records might become relevant to a criminal investigation”).
Id. at 812.
Finklea et al., supra note 61, at 3.
Clapper, 785 F.3d at 793. The court also noted that even metadata could permit inferences about content in some instances. Id. at 794 & n.1 (citing Yves‐Alexandre de
Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card Metadata,
347 SCIENCE 536, 536 (2015)).
MARINER & ANNAS, supra note 33, at 456–57, 460, 544.
Id. at 459.
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ever, the stated need is similar to the NSA’s claims of relevance to an
investigation. Of course, the NSA was looking for terrorists, not epidemics or data for medical research. Could this mean that ongoing
data collection for criminal purposes violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, while doing the same for civil purposes does not?
A final difference between the third-party doctrine line of cases
and mandatory health reporting laws lies in attitudes towards the information at issue. The third-party doctrine cases conclude that the
person whose information is held by a third party has either voluntarily abandoned all control over the information or no longer has any
legitimate property interest or reasonable expectation of privacy in
141
the information. Neither of these presumptions completely squares
142
As to the expectawith public attitudes about health information.
tion of privacy, most patients expect that physicians, hospitals and insurers will not disclose identifiable data to the government unless the
government has an independently justifiable basis for requiring the
disclosure—beyond the mere fact that it exists in a medical record
143
State and federal laws protecting the confiheld by a third party.
dentiality of medical records, from the common law duty of confiden144
145
tiality to the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rule, support protecting
141

142

143

144

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 73–74 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 302 (1966).
See MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA, at 32 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/publicprivacy-perceptions/ (reporting a 2014 survey’s findings that, after social security numbers (90% very sensitive), respondents reported that their health status and medication
information is very sensitive (55%) or somewhat sensitive (26%); phone conversations
were similar (54% very sensitive; 27% somewhat sensitive), as well as email messages (52%
very sensitive; 25% somewhat sensitive)); see also David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069,
1110 (2014) (arguing that the Supreme Court is “wrong to declare that an individual can
have no ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ in anything shared voluntarily with someone
else,” in part because individuals have different privacy expectations and needs from different entities).
See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (recognizing “the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters”); Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 371 F.3d
1173, 1179, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that laws authorizing health department access
to abortion clinic patient records constitute unreasonable searches, because patients and
physicians have a heightened expectation of privacy in medical information; and that
abortion clinics were not a regulated industry subject to administrative search standards);
State v. Skinner, 10 So.3d 1212, 1218 (La. 2009) (noting that “the right to privacy in one’s
medical and prescription records is an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment).
See e.g., Fort Wayne Women’s Health v. Bd. of Commissioners, Allen Cnty., Indiana, 735 F.
Supp. 2d 1045, 1057 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Medical patients have an actual expectation of
privacy in their medical records and society sees this expectation as reasonable.”); Alberts
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health information from unauthorized disclosure. Such laws reflect
societal acceptance that the expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable.
As to voluntarily abandoning control over one’s information, numerous scholars observe that almost all activities of daily life require
people to trust their identifiable information with third parties, such
146
The overwhelming
as banks, cable service providers, and retailers.
147
majority of Americans seek health care every year. Individuals have
no choice but to allow their health care providers and insurers to
hold identifiable information about them—increasingly in digital
format.
Two of the four dissenting Justices in Smith unsuccessfully pressed
a related argument in 1979. Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by
Justice William J. Brennan, rejected the Smith majority’s reasoning
that people who give information to third parties “assume the risk”
148
Assumpthat their information will be conveyed to government.

145

146

147

148

v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Mass. 1985) (“We continue to recognize a patient’s valid
interest in preserving the confidentiality of medical facts communicated to a physician or
discovered by the physician through examination.”); Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance v.
Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (“The state of a person’s gastrointestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from unauthorized public or bureaucratic
snooping as is that person’s bank account, the contents of his library or his membership
in the NAACP.”); see also Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 2000) (requiring a
warrant to access medical/prescription records); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (“There can be no question that an employee’s
medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within
the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.”); John B. v. Superior Court, 137
P.3d 153, 166–67 (Cal. 2006) (the right to privacy extends to medical records).
45 C.F.R. § 160.202(1)(4); 45 C.F.R. § 164.105(a)(2)(ii)(A); see also In the Matter of Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 2011) (rejecting argument that the HIPAA Privacy Rule
permitted government to obtain medical records without a court order); Nw. Mem’l
Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 924, 928–29 (7th Cir. 2004) (quashing a government
subpoena for abortion records and noting that compliance would be “an invasion of privacy”). Other federal laws can affect health records. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233; 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a); see also Sam
Kamin, The Private is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth Amendment,
46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 85 (2004) (arguing that conceptions of privacy in the private sector
should influence expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
See PASQUALE, supra note 41, at 4–5; David Cole, Preserving Privacy in a Digital Age: Lessons
of Comparative Constitutionalism, in SURVEILLANCE, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Fergal Davis et al., eds., 2013); Stephen E. Henderson, After United
States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 431,
435 (2013) (“We now live in a world of ubiquitous third party information.”).
John R. Pleis et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults:
National Health Interview Survey, 2009, in, 10 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 1, 124 (2010), http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_249.pdf.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 752 (1979) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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tion of risk, he argued, implies “some notion of choice,” 149 which does
not exist where a person has “no realistic alternative” to using a “per150
Instead, he consonal or professional necessity” like a telephone.
tinued, the question is not what risks a person should be presumed to
accept, but “the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and
151
open society.”
These features of mandatory reporting laws—ongoing populationwide, suspicionless searches for civil uses and today’s practical necessity of giving health information to third parties—contrast significantly with the assumptions underlying the third-party doctrine. The distinctions suggest that there may be room for Fourth Amendment
protection of identifiable health data held by health, insurance or in152
To externet service providers—at least in some circumstances.
plore the feasibility of such protection, it may help to know which elements of the third-party doctrine are essential to its retention. If
those elements are no longer plausible, then the doctrine need not
apply in all circumstances.
B. Third-Party Doctrine Rationales
The Supreme Court has offered various, but not always consistent,
153
reasons for applying the third-party doctrine. One is that a person
has voluntarily abandoned his information to the third party. This
equates telling one’s physician about physical or mental symptoms
154
It strains credulity to think
with leaving the trash out for pickup.
that a person who confides in her physician believes she is throwing
out her personal information for anyone to see.
Another way of viewing the concept of abandonment of one’s information is to posit that a person who tells another person something necessarily (and thus voluntarily) consents to the further distri-

149
150

151
152

153
154

Id. at 749.
Id. at 750. Echoes of Justice Marshall’s arguments may be found in Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 2473 (2014) and United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). See infra text accompanying notes 162–69.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For arguments that the third-party doctrine should be modified or abandoned in the
criminal context, see LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 2.7 (criticizing Miller); see also Freiwald,
supra note 102; Henderson, supra note 98; Lawless, supra note 102. For arguments favoring retaining the doctrine, see generally Kerr, supra note 102.
See Kerr, supra note 107, at 506 (arguing that the Court actually uses four different factdependent approaches to deciding Fourth Amendment claims in the criminal context).
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
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bution of his or her information. 155 This voluntary consent rationale
is consistent with the principle that consent to a search renders the
156
However,
search reasonable without probable cause or a warrant.
the seminal cases that rely on consent to justify a warrantless search
157
involve a defendant who expressly agreed to the search in person.
Indeed, Georgia v. Randolph suggests that a third party cannot consent
158
to a search on behalf of a spouse who is also present in the home.
The third-party doctrine departs from the cases of actual consent by
implying consent where it has not in fact been given. This looks
more like constructive consent than voluntary consent, although the
Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted a theory of constructive
159
consent.
Justice Antonin Scalia argued, in dissent, that a hospital is free to
voluntarily report the results of a patient’s diagnostic tests to the police, because reporting by the hospital is consensual and therefore
160
Under this view, it is the connot a Fourth Amendment violation.
161
Justice
sent of the third party, not of the patient, that controls.
Scalia concludes that “information obtained through violation of a
relationship of trust is obtained consensually, and is hence not a

155

156

157
158

159

160
161

This is the reasoning seen in the false friend cases. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 751 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 293 (1966) (quoting Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 123 (2002) (arguing that many third-party
doctrine cases should be reevaluated under consent principles); Christine Jolls, Privacy
and Consent Over Time: The Role of Agreement in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2013) (describing when and how consent to searches has been determinative); Kerr, supra note 102, at 589–90 (arguing that third-party doctrine cases are
better viewed as cases of consent to disclosure rather than abandonment of privacy expectations).
See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (concerning an in-person
consent to search of a car).
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 112 (2006). But see Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct.
1126, 1129 (2014) (finding that once the objecting occupant is removed from the premises, a third party can consent to a search).
See Jolls, supra note 156, at 1701 (arguing that the validity of consent could vary depending on whether the search is contemporaneous with or much later than the consent).
Cases involving drug testing of government employees have not relied on express, contemporaneous consent by individual employees. Instead, their “consent” to testing was a
condition of their employment. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 672 (1989) (upholding drug testing of applicants for U.S. Custom Service jobs involving drug interdiction or carrying a firearm); see also infra Part IV.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 96 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (stating that a search with consent does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
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search.” 162 As precedent for this conclusion, however, Justice Scalia
relies on criminal cases in which a criminal suspect or defendant has
confided something about a crime to an informant, and the inform163
While the deant passes the information on to law enforcement.
fendant may have hoped or even expected the informer would not
betray the confidence, the informant had no duty of confidentiality
to the defendant. Those facts differ from a patient’s justifiable reliance on a health provider’s duty to keep medical information confi164
More importantly, a provider who is compelled by law to
dential.
report patient data to a government agency does not voluntarily con165
sent to disclose the information. Thus, the false friend and willing
informant cases offer no precedent for the notion that providers consent to disclosing data pursuant to mandatory reporting laws.
The abandonment/consent rationale has lost most of its credibility in today’s interdependent economy. Only those living “off the
grid” can avoid providing detailed personal information to accom166
plish the most basic tasks of daily living. Bank, telephone, cable, internet, insurance, employment, household purchases, and most other
ordinary transactions require entrusting third parties with detailed
167
The information is often particularly sensipersonal information.
162

163

164
165

166

167

See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining how information obtained
through a violation of trust is consensual and thus does not trigger a Fourth Amendment
violation).
See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 311 (1966); United States v. Dunning, 312 F.3d 528, 531 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that a prison inmate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in letters sent to girlfriend).
Fort Wayne Women’s Health v. Bd. of Commissioners, Allen Cty., Indiana, 735 F. Supp.
2d 1045, 1057 (N.D. Ind. 2010); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Mass. 1985).
See Carroll v. City of Westminster, 233 F.3d 208, 210 (4th Cir. 2000) (drug testing); Aubrey v. Sch. Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1998) (drug testing); Nat’l
Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that “a
search [drug testing] otherwise unreasonable [under the Fourth Amendment] cannot be
redeemed by a public employer’s exaction of a ‘consent’ to the search as a condition of
employment”); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1987) (drug testing);
see also Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 701 (1996) (arguing for use of the special needs doctrine for routine
investigations in the employment context); Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 282 (2012) (arguing for using the special needs doctrine for
routine suspicionless investigations and probable cause for individual investigations of
wrongdoing).
See Posner, supra note 30, at 248 (“[A] person would have to be a hermit to be able to
function in our society without voluntarily disclosing a vast amount of personal information to a vast array of public and private demanders.”); see also supra note 109.
Laura Donahue, Bulk Data Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 870 (2014) (stating that “[t]he extent to which we rely on electronic communications to conduct our daily lives is of a fundamentally different scale and
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tive in the context of the physician-patient relationship. Thus, the
idea that disclosure is voluntary or that it equates to consent to further disclosure or to granting a third party control over the infor168
mation seems implausibly archaic. Rather, applying the third-party
doctrine to obtain information that a person cannot realistically avoid
giving third parties is functionally the same as allowing the govern169
ment to seize the information directly from the person.
170
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Riley v. California and United
171
States v. Jones suggest some support for this conclusion. Justice
Sotomayor, in an often-quoted concurrence in Jones, noted:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks. . . . I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amend172
ment protection.

The unanimous decision in Riley took this sentiment to heart, recognizing that digital technology and information pose new challenges to Fourth Amendment doctrines. The Court concluded that the
police needed a warrant to search the arrested suspect’s smart phone,
because the phone’s contents could not be considered part of an
173
otherwise permissible warrantless search incident to an arrest.
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion rejected the government’s argument
that searching a cell phone was materially indistinguishable from
searching physical items:
That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable
from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point

168

169

170
171
172
173

complexity than the situation that existed at the time the Court heard arguments in
Smith”).
See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 638,
647 (2015) (arguing that “sharing information with a doctor is the precondition of obtaining medical care,” rendering such sharing involuntary).
Donald A. Dripps, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, MINN. L. REV., manuscript at 24
(forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692296 (“To
the extent that the consumer has no way to opt-out of sharing with the government what
she shares with the provider, the data collected are indistinguishable from the government acquiring . . . data directly.”).
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement was not at issue, because police searched the phone about two hours after taking Riley into custody. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81.
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B, but little else justifies lumping them together. Modern cell phones, as
a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the
174
search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.

The opinion described the vast amount of information that can be
accessed through a cell phone, a description that also applies to any
device that uses the internet, specifically noting that “a cell phone
search would typically expose to the government far more than the
175
Among the sensitive informost exhaustive search of a house.”
mation mentioned is health information:
[C]ertain types of data are also qualitatively different. An Internet search
and browsing history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled
phone and could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—
perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent
176
visits to WebMD.

Riley makes clear that the government may need some individualized suspicion to search the contents of a person’s telephone, which
is typically held remotely by third parties: “Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized in177
cident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”
The Riley opinion thus suggests that the Court is beginning to
recognize that the transformation wrought by information technology may require easing the categorical boundaries of Fourth Amendment doctrines. This may translate to the third-party doctrine.
A second reason for the third-party doctrine appears to be that
the third party collects the information for its own use in its busi178
Stated another way, the information about an individual beness.
comes the property of the third party, who is free to dispose of the information as it pleases, like the bank in Miller or the telephone
company in Smith. Even if one accepts this reasoning, it does not
necessarily follow that the government is entitled to obtain the information without the consent of either the third party who holds the
174
175

176
177
178

Id. at 2488–89.
Id. at 2491. Riley can be viewed as a recognizing that the breadth of information uncovered or perused would grossly exceed the purposes for which a warrantless search incident to arrest is conducted (officer safety and spoliation of evidence) and therefore has
constitutional significance. The sensitivity of the information may be of secondary importance, because the search of a wallet or purse incident to arrest can reveal equally sensitive information, such as a prescription bottle or an Alcoholics Anonymous thirty-day
chip.
Id. at 2490.
Id. at 2495.
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444
(1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 101, 147–50 (2004).
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information or the person who is the information source. Mandatory
reporting laws do not allow the third party to refuse. Thus, by itself,
the premise that the third party has custody or control over the information does not answer the question whether the government can
compel the third party to turn it over.
Holders of medical information might be considered bailees, who
hold the information for limited purposes and are not free to other179
wise dispose of it without the source’s permission. So far, most cases have limited this concept of bailment to circumstances in which
180
the bailor was not expected to keep the items for its own use.
Health providers do use a patient’s information in their business, albeit for the patient’s benefit. While medical records may facilitate
the provider’s treatment of patients, they are not created solely to
manage business practices. Medical records contain information that
a patient entrusts to her physician (or hospital or other provider) for
181
specific, limited purposes. The physician, who owes quasi-fiduciary
duties to the patient, is often viewed as holding the contents of the
patient’s medical record as a custodian or possibly a type of trustee
182
for the benefit of the patient.
While physicians and health care facilities may have custody of
medical records, they do not necessarily view themselves as owning
the contents in the same fashion or to the same extent that banks
own their business records of financial transactions. Scholarly views
of medical record ownership vary, with some commentators arguing
that while the provider may own the record, the patient owns the in183
Others note that patients cannot assert
formation in the record.
any ownership interest in medical records or the information they
184
contain. And state laws vary in their attribution of ownership to the
179
180

181

182

183
184

See Henderson, supra note 146, at 437–38 (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment might
protect data left with a bailee that is not for the bailee’s own use).
See, e.g., United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (bag left with store
clerk); United States v. Barry, 853 F.2d 1479, 1482 (8th Cir. 1988) (suitcase left at airport). But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282-83 (6th Cir. 2010) (email held
by service provider).
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The patient’s reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond
those associated with arms-length transactions.”).
Principles of medical ethics confirm the physician’s duty of confidentiality. AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics, www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/
code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.page (“IV. A physician shall . . . safeguard
patient confidences and privacy within the constraints of the law.”).
See GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 227 (Eve Carey, ed., 3d ed. 2004).
See, e.g., Barbara Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 70, 74–75
(2011); Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 1 at 111.

Feb. 2016]

HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY

1011

patient or the provider, with many not expressly addressing the is185
sue. In these circumstances, one cannot confidently conclude that
the information in medical records is indisputably the property of the
third party to do with as it chooses.
Indeed, Professor Jack Balkin argues that professionals like physicians qualify as “information fiduciaries” who must not breach confi186
dentiality without the patient’s consent or a very strong reason.
Kiel Brennan-Marquez argues that such information fiduciaries acquire obligations not because they are trusted in fact, but because
they perform an important social function that requires information
187
sharing. The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty—and confidentiality—are normative constraints intended to prevent exploitation of
the more vulnerable party by the more powerful party in an arm’s
188
length relationship.
There is a strong ethical tradition in medicine, codified in statutes
189
Of
and case law, of keeping patient information confidential.
course, common law duties of confidentiality themselves do not give
rise to constitutional protection. After all, Miller did not consider that
common law recognition of a confidential relationship between a
bank and a depositor affected the depositor’s expectation of priva190
Congress reacted to Miller by enacting the Right to Financial
cy.
Privacy Act of 1978 to permit bank customers to challenge the gov191
Unlike the
ernment’s justification for subpoenas of bank records.
Court, Congress at least recognized that people do have some reasonable expectation of privacy in their financial information, even if
government sometimes has good reason to override that expectation.
185

186
187
188
189
190

191

Cf. FLA. STAT. § 456.057 (1) (“[T]he term “records owner” means any health care practitioner who generates a medical record after making a physical or mental examination of,
or administering treatment or dispensing legend drugs to, any person.”); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70 (2015) (implying that clinics and identified heath facilities own
the records because the obligations to maintain them transfer with a change in ownership
of the facilities themselves); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(A) (2015) (“Health records
are the property of the health care entity maintaining them. . . .”).
Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html.
Brennan–Marquez, supra note 168, at 613, 628 (arguing that the concept of misplaced
trust should not apply to information fiduciaries like hospitals and physicians).
Id. at 649–51.
See, e.g., AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics, supra note 182; Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d
113, 118–20 (Mass. 1985)
.
See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961) (concerning breach of
duty of confidentiality by bank); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:
Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 133 (2007) (comparing U.S. and
British tort law governing breach of confidentiality).
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–21.

1012

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:3

The question is whether all privacy protection for records held by
third parties must come from the legislature and none from the
192
Fourth Amendment.
A third rationale for the third-party doctrine is that the person has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. This reason
has at least two different interpretations. One is essentially the same
as voluntary abandonment or consent and is unpersuasive for the
same reasons. The second is that the information at issue is not
something that society is prepared to recognize as worth protecting.
Or, in Katz terminology, the expectation is not “one that society is
193
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” This reason has more bite,
but is fact-dependent. As noted above, there are enough laws limiting the disclosure of health information to conclude that society accepts as reasonable an expectation of privacy in that information.
Such laws recognize that it is the content of the information that determines whether it is worthy of expectations of privacy, not who
194
Society may recognize some information as warranting
holds it.
privacy protection, regardless of where it sits.
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court recognized that
patients have a reasonable expectation that the information they provide to their physicians will be used solely for the purpose of their
own diagnosis and treatment and not shared with other entities with195
out the patient’s consent—at least for law enforcement purposes.
The state hospital in Ferguson tested urine samples from pregnant
women in prenatal care or at delivery to identify cocaine users and
reported those with positive tests to police, all without a warrant,
probable cause, individualized suspicion or (the Court assumed) the
196
patients’ knowledge or consent. The police initially arrested all re192

193
194
195
196

See Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Is
Rudderless in the Digital Age Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 47, 76 (2014) (arguing that Congress should periodically amend laws like the
ECPA and SCA to protect digital privacy, thereby establishing a floor of reasonable expectations of privacy).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
But see Brennan–Marquez, supra note 168, at 639–40 (arguing against focusing on the
sensitivity of the information, rather than the fiduciary duties of the holder).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
Patients were selected for testing if they met at least one of the following nine criteria:
no, late, or incomplete prenatal care; abruption placentae; intrauterine fetal death; preterm labor or intrauterine growth retardation “of no obvious cause”; previously known
drug or alcohol abuse; or unexplained congenital anomalies. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70–73.
These factors, however, could be present for many reasons unrelated to drug use. See id.
at 76; Emmalee S. Bandstra et al., Prenatal Drug Exposure: Infant and Toddler Outcomes, 29 J.
ADDICTIVE DISEASES 245 (2010); Jeanne Flavin & Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Pregnant
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ported patients on drug charges. Later, under a modified policy, only patients who failed to enter and comply with a drug treatment program were arrested. The hospital argued that its search and reporting policy was justified by the special need to protect the health of
197
both mother and child. The Court rejected that claim, finding that
the “Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches necessarily applies to such
198
a policy.”
A threshold question was whether the patients had consented to
providing a urine sample for the purpose of drug testing and report199
The Supreme Court majority
ing test results to law enforcement.
presumed lack of consent, and on remand to decide that issue, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence that any patient “validly consented to the taking and testing of
200
Since
her urine for law enforcement, as opposed to medical, purposes”.
the Supreme Court’s decision rested heavily on the law enforcement
purpose of the drug tests, the patients’ lack of consent cemented the
conclusion that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
Ferguson did not address the question whether police could compel the hospital to produce the drug test results if there had been no
policy in effect and physicians had ordered the tests solely for purposes of treating the women. The Court did not mention the thirdparty doctrine. It analyzed the case in terms of the special needs doctrine, finding that law enforcement is not a special need that would
justify an exception to the warrant requirement. But, in doing so, it
made clear that the patients had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their medical information:
The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will
201
not be shared with non-medical personnel without her consent.

197
198
199

200
201

Drug-Using Women: Defying Law, Medicine, and Common Sense, 29 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 231,
233 (2010); Barry Zuckerman, Drug-Exposed Infants: Understanding the Medical Risks, 1 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 26, 28–31 (1991). The vast majority tested were poor women of
color. Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1991).
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81. For further discussion of the special needs doctrine, see infra Part
V.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The urine tests were “indisputably
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 76.
The Court was not entirely clear whether it was addressing consent to (1) taking the sample, (2) testing the sample for cocaine, or (3) reporting the results to law enforcement,
but appeared to be particularly concerned about (3). See id. at 77–80.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 395 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original).
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
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The implication is that law enforcement would need a warrant, or at
least a subpoena, to obtain the drug test results. In this case, however, the police had no a priori reason to suspect any of the patients of a
202
crime.
Nevertheless, one might ask why the Court did not consider the
third-party doctrine. In theory, that doctrine would allow the hospital to give medical test results to the police voluntarily, leaving the patients with no Fourth Amendment protection. Indeed, this is what
Justice Scalia argued, dissenting from the Ferguson majority’s opin203
ion. In the dissent’s view, if a patient consents to a medical test in
course of ordinary treatment, she loses any expectation of privacy in
the results of that test.
What might Ferguson imply for mandatory reporting laws requiring
test results or other medical information to be reported to a government agency? The dissent argued that the majority’s opinion would
mean that “the Fourth Amendment would invalidate those many state
laws that require physicians to report gunshot wounds, evidence of
204
spousal abuse, and . . . evidence of child abuse.” In a footnote, the
dissent adds, “If voluntary betrayal of a trust in mere cooperation with
the police constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, surely betrayal of
205
a trust at the direction of the legislature must be.” Justice Anthony
Kennedy, concurring in the majority’s opinion, disagreed, noting
without explanation that the decision “does not call into question the
validity of mandatory reporting laws such as child abuse laws which
require teachers to report evidence of child abuse to the proper au206
thorities, even if arrest and prosecution is the likely result.” These
brief comments cannot be said to resolve the question.
None of the Justices’ opinions actually analyzes mandatory reporting laws, of course. State reporting laws are enacted in order to permit health care providers to violate their duty of confidentiality by
disclosing patient information. If there is no constitutional impediment to voluntary reporting by providers, why do states bother to enact such laws? One answer may be that providers desire statutory
confirmation that they will not be subject to liability to patients for
such disclosures. If true, it turns reporting laws into symbolic gestures. Legislatures do sometimes grant immunity from liability to
202
203
204
205
206

See supra note 186.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 123–
26.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 96 n.3.
Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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those entities who comply with regulations that the state is empow207
But, such legislation is not required. Why, then,
ered to adopt.
would states presume that they must enact affirmative legislation to
justify the compelled reporting of medical information? The Court’s
decisions applying the third-party doctrine do not offer a clear answer.
It is possible that the third-party doctrine could be extended to
compel third party reporting on an ongoing basis without individual208
It is also possible that the third-party doctrine
ized suspicion.
should not apply to those circumstances at all, either because it has
no application in the civil context or because other Fourth Amendment doctrines are better suited to resolving that issue. Both the line
of cases involving administrative searches and that involving
suspicionless searches for purposes of ‘special needs’ beyond law enforcement address the application of the Fourth Amendment in the
civil context. To those cases, we now turn.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
The line of cases developing the special needs doctrine grew
alongside the cases addressing administrative searches, such that the
special needs doctrine includes elements of the administrative search
exception plus its own increasingly opaque boundaries. It is worth
considering administrative searches themselves, since reporting laws
could be seen as a form of searching the records of health entities.
Administrative searches conducted without probable cause were
initially justified as a narrow exception to Fourth Amendment re209
quirements. The exception applied first to inspections of regulated
business premises and housing. Routine inspections for compliance
with health and safety regulations were believed necessary to identify
and prevent hidden dangers, such as defective heating or electrical
systems, but government typically had no probable cause to suspect
207

208
209

Good Samaritan Laws often offer protections from liability for classes of identified individuals (usually medical professionals) for unintended harms caused by the use of their
skills to provide aid, usually in an emergency outside their practice. For a listing of state
laws, see Suzanne E. Turner, Good Samaritan Laws: A Comparative Study of Laws That Protect
First Responders Who Assist Accident Victims, A RESEARCH NOTE BY DECHERT LLP FOR
SAVELIFE FOUNDATION (May 2014), http://www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/
7be34cce-ea0d-4c90-8b39-53427acf4c43/file.
The Fourth Amendment “generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure
absent individualized suspicion.” Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
LAFAVE, supra note 102, §§ 10.1–10.2; see also Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2457
(2015) (“To classify hotels as pervasively regulated would permit what has always been a
narrow exception to swallow the rule.”).
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that any particular person or business was violating the law. 210 Dangerous conditions that needed remediation were not necessarily apparent, so neither probable cause nor location-specific suspicion
211
To prevent arbitrary or abusive searches, a
could be expected.
search warrant was required to describe the type of business or geo212
Instead of basing warrants on probagraphic area to be searched.
ble cause, however, a court could determine whether government has
213
“a valid public interest [that] justifies the intrusion contemplated.”
As the scope of business regulation expanded, licensing and similar legislation included requirements for when and how such routine
214
These requirements became an accepted
inspections took place.
substitute for the warrant requirement as a check on arbitrary gov215
ernment action. The Court summarized the criteria for a permissible warrantless search as follows: (1) the regulatory scheme furthers
a “substantial” government interest; (2) the warrantless inspections
are “necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme”; and (3) the “inspection program, in terms of certainty and regularity of its applica216
tion,” is a “constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”
Still, warrantless administrative searches were limited to searches
217
that were not looking for evidence of a crime, were conducted pur-

210

211

212

213
214
215
216

217

See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (striking down fire code inspections, but
indicating that warrants for future inspections could be issued pursuant to a more flexible
standard for probable cause to enforce regulations).
See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (auto disassembly business); Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (electrical and plumbing installation); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (licensed pawn shop and firearms dealer); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (licensed liquor store).
Camara v. Municipal Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that annual inspection
for housing code violations required a warrant, but warrant could be based on likelihood
of finding violations in a geographic area instead of individualized suspicion). A warrant
could encompass an entire geographic area or an industry within that area, because officials need to know whether that regulated population is complying with health, safety,
fire and sanitation requirements. Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
See id. at 528 (“The basic purpose of this Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.”).
See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 255,
262–70 (2011) (describing the development of administrative search doctrine).
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03 (citation omitted). The second criterion allows warrantless
inspections where advance notice would allow violations to be concealed or eliminated.
Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316; see, 387 U.S. at 545.
See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (striking down checkpoint to search
vehicles for illegal aliens). The distinction between civil and criminal searches is not always as clear as the doctrine suggests, because criminal sanctions such as fines and incarceration are often authorized and imposed for refusing a search or for violations found as
a result of an inspection. Camara, 387 U.S. at 531.
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suant to statutory rules that limited official discretion, 218 did not suspect or target individuals, and where the intrusion on privacy was
219
As government found more reasons to
minimal and not personal.
look for problems, the focus of analysis shifted from the earlier goal
of ensuring safe premises to the reasonableness of the government’s
purpose in obtaining certain information and the procedural regular220
Thus, the government’s reason for conity of the search process.
ducting inspections without any prior suspicion of individualized
wrongdoing assumed increasing salience in doctrinal analysis, overshadowing concern for intrusions on personal privacy.
Many decisions do permit administrative subpoenas in the civil
regulatory context to investigate threats to employee health and safety. These decisions fit within the original conception of administrative
searches—enforcement of civil regulatory requirements pursuant to
express procedural requirements. For example, the Mine Safety
Health Administration’s interest in the health and safety of miners
outweighed the miners’ interest in keeping their medical information
out of the wrong hands in Big Ridge, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety and
221
Mine Safety Health Administration
Health Review Commission.
(“MSHA”) regulations required mine operators to allow inspectors to
obtain medical and personnel records to verify the validity of the operator’s reports on injuries to miners. In this case, MSHA sought the
records without a warrant to see whether an operator with many past
violations was underreporting injuries.
The court noted that United States v. Miller might be thought to
preclude any Fourth Amendment right to privacy on the part of the
miners, because the records were in the custody of the mine opera222
But it also found that “some personal records are so private
tor.
that, even when entrusted to another, an individual retains some
218
219

220

221
222

Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 605 (1981).
Where a search could be based on individualized suspicion, however, probable cause or a
warrant was often required. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (rejecting random vehicle stops to find unlicensed drivers in favor of targeting vehicles in violation of motor vehicle laws).
The Camara Court recognized that a warrant for an administrative search could not be
based on probable cause for finding individual violators. Instead, a warrant could encompass an entire geographic area or an industry within that area, because officials need
to know whether that entire population is complying with health, safety, fire and sanitation requirements. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535; see also Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 198–200 (1993); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 383, 383–86 (1988).
715 F.3d 631, 644 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 649.
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amount of protection of the privacy of the records in the third party’s
223
custody.” This presented “a difficult question of balancing” for the
224
court. It found that the demands for records were best understood
as administrative subpoenas, rather than warrantless searches. They
were justified without a warrant because the record request was necessary to protect the workers, it met the administrative search criteria
of Burger, and MSHA was legally required to keep miners’ medical in225
formation confidential.
Earlier, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) received a
request from an employee union to conduct a “health hazard evalua226
tion” at a Westinghouse plant. After inspecting the facility, NIOSH
issued a subpoena to obtain employee medical records to determine
whether employees were experiencing allergic reactions to
hexahydrophthalic anhydride (“HHPA”). The circuit court found
that the employees’ medical records were entitled to privacy protection under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, without dis227
cussing the Fourth Amendment. But it concluded that the employees’ privacy interests were outweighed by a combination of factors:
the agency’s interest in protecting occupational safety and health; its
need for the records in order to compare employees’ medical conditions before and after exposure to HHPA; the information was not
highly sensitive, consisting primarily of routine test results; and
NIOSH procedures for keeping the data secure and confidential.
Thus, the court issued an order enforcing the subpoena, but nonetheless allowed each employee to object to the production of his or
228
her own records. This result may have been influenced by the fact
223
224
225

226

227

228

Id.
Id.
Id. at 650 (describing how the federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, required the agency to
keep the employees’ personal information confidential and not disclose it to others without the employee’s consent). In addition, the federal Mine Safety and Health Act allowed the mine operators to contest proposed penalties for noncompliance, which the
operator did in this case. Id. at 652.
638 F.2d 570, 572 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 581 n.7 (“[T]he best solution-no matter who may be the custodian of the records in
the particular instance-is to require that the party seeking to secure the records by subpoena give the patient notice of the issuance of the subpoena, and to permit the patient
to contest its enforcement by whatever means is regarded as satisfying the requirements
of due process.” (citing Kaiser, Privacy and Medical Record-Keeping, included in Privacy:
the Collection, Use, and Computerization of Personal Data (Part 2): Joint Senate Hearings before the Ad Hoc Comm. on Government Operations and Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2240, 2246 (June 18–20,
1974))).
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 578–80.
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NIOSH’s investigation was initiated in response to a request on behalf of the employees themselves.
These and similar administrative searches of employee medical
records have one similarity to reporting laws intended to investigate
contagious disease outbreaks: the agencies are looking for existing
threats to the health or safety of a particular group of people –
threats that can be removed and that the agency is authorized to halt.
The agency may need identifiable information about certain individuals and their current medical status in order to find and stop the
spread of disease.
Yet the administrative subpoena cases also differ from other medical reporting or surveillance systems, like PDMPs, newborn screening
banks, and registries of immunizations, cancer and other chronic diseases. The latter are not designed to identify immediate threats to
the health or safety of a particular group of people. Rather, they engage in the ongoing collection of data for the purpose of making it
available for multiple future uses – primarily civil, but occasionally
criminal. Thus, these cases offer rather strained analogies for determining the validity of most health surveillance laws.
In 2015, a bare 5-4 majority of the Court constrained the scope of
administrative searches in a case where the government’s reason was
not questioned. In Los Angeles v. Patel, it concluded that the administrative search exception applies only to closely regulated businesses –
those that are comprehensively regulated and inherently “pose a
clear and significant risk to the public welfare,” and hotels did not fall
229
Hotel operators successfully challenged a 116into this category.
year-old city ordinance requiring them to record identifying information about guests and allow police to inspect the guest registers on
demand. Noncompliance was a misdemeanor. The Court held that
its prior decisions required the subject of an administrative search to
have an “opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a neu230
This would allow administrative subpoenas,
tral decisionmaker.”

229

230

Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015). The Court said that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by [a] judge or [a] magistrate
[judge], are per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” Id. at 2452 (internal quotation marks omitted). It further noted
that it had recognized only four such industries in past decisions. Id. at 2454 (citing New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (automobile junkyard); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594 (1981) (mining); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (firearms dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 7 U.S. 72, 76–77 (1970) (liquor sales)).
Id. at 2452.
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but also permit the subject of the subpoena to seek an order to
231
quash.
Patel is a narrow, but significant, ruling. The majority assumed
that the searches authorized by the ordinance “serve a special need
other than conducting criminal investigations: They ensure compliance with the recordkeeping requirement, which in turn deters crim232
Nevertheless, the
inals from operating on the hotel’s premises.”
Court also noted in a footnote that the law was facially unconstitutional, even if the search’s purpose were to facilitate criminal investi233
In particular, it emphasized that closely regulated indusgations.
234
Laws merely requiring a
tries are the exception, not the rule.
license and adherence to sanitary standards are not enough to quali235
The dissenting Justices disagreed with this analysis, finding the
fy.
236
city ordinance “eminently reasonable” and meeting the Burger
237
standards. Thus, the Court seems divided on how to define permissible, suspicionless administrative searches.
Should health care providers, pharmacies, or insurers be considered closely regulated industries for purposes of permitting mandatory reporting? These entities certainly have a health and safety mission, but it is not clear whether the Supreme Court would
characterize them as closely regulated for purposes of the administra238
One obstacle to
tive search exception to the Fourth Amendment.
analogizing reporting laws to administrative searches is that reporting
laws (in contrast to licensure laws) lack the administrative regulatory
structures authorizing and constraining agency investigations of an
industry. That is, the reporting statutes do not typically include Burger standards regulating access to medical records. If government
231

232
233
234

235
236
237
238

Id. at 2452–53 (“Absent an opportunity for precompliance review, the ordinance creates
an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it will exceed statutory limits, or be used as
a pretext to harass hotel operators and their guests.”).
Id. at 2452 (noting that the hotels did not challenge the requirement to keep a guest registry or the legitimacy of the city’s interest, especially in preventing human trafficking).
Id. at 2452 n.2.
Id. at 2455; see also Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 787 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2015)
(striking down warrantless search of records kept by sexually explicit film producers as violation of Fourth Amendment). In Free Speech Coalition, Inc., the court found that because
this was not an administrative search of a closely regulated industry and there was no real
risk of hiding or destroying records of actors’ ages, a warrant would be needed to search
records. Id. at 171–72.
Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2455.
Id. at 2457 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2459.
See, e.g., Williams v. Kentucky, 213 S.W.3d 671, 678 (Ky. 2006) (finding that a “warrantless
raid” on a medical clinic to find evidence of unlawful physician prescriptions of controlled substances was not an administrative search of a closely regulated industry).
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could require specific data to be reported simply as part of an administrative search, it should also be able to require access to the complete medical records of the facility. Patel suggests that there must be
more justification than this.
Other federal and state court decisions support the conclusion
that patients have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their medi239
cal records. These cases typically require probable cause for a warrant or court order to obtain medical records for a criminal investiga240
tion or to enforce an administrative subpoena.
241
An interesting example is Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden. There,
physicians who provide abortion services challenged the state’s law
requiring them, inter alia, to submit to warrantless inspections of their
offices and provide unredacted patient medical records and send ul242
The circuit court noted that the
trasound prints to third parties.
reason for allowing warrantless administrative searches for regulatory
purposes is that closely regulated enterprises have a diminished ex243
pectation of privacy. In contrast, it found, “the expectation of pri244
vacy is heightened” in abortion clinics. This heightened expectation
239

240

241
242
243
244

See Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450–51 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that society recognizes
as objectively reasonable a patient’s expectation of privacy in records and files of his
treatment maintained by substance abuse treatment center, because “medical treatment
records contain intimate and private details that people do not wish to have disclosed,
expect will remain private, and, as a result, believe are entitled to some measure of protection from unfettered access by government officials”); United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (“There can be no question that an employee’s medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection. Information about one’s body
and state of health is matter which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the
‘private enclave where he may lead a private life.’”); State v. Skinner, 10 So. 3d 1212, 1218
(La. 2009) (“[W]e find that the right to privacy in one’s medical and prescription records
is an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”); King v.
State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. 2000) (“[A] patient’s medical information, as reflected in
the records maintained by his or her medical providers, is certainly a matter which a reasonable person would consider to be private.”); Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135,
139–40 (Pa. 1994) (noting that a person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
medical records”).
See Skinner, 10 So. 3d at 1218 (“[A]bsent the narrowly drawn exceptions permitting warrantless searches, we hold a warrant is required to conduct an investigatory search of
medical and/or prescription records.”); State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 449 (Mont. 1997)
(finding the state must show probable cause for the issuance of an investigative subpoena
for the discovery of medical records); Riedel, 651 A.2d at 139–40 (requiring probable
cause for access to medical records); State v. Copeland, 680 S.W.2d 327, 330–31 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (requiring probable cause for the results of blood tests).
379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 550 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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arose not only because abortion is “a service grounded in a fundamental constitutional liberty,” but also because “all provision of medical service in a private physicians’ offices carries with it a high expec245
Thus, the court
tation of privacy for both physician and patient.”
found that the clinics could not be considered closely regulated and
the statute’s authorization of warrantless searches violated the Fourth
246
Amendment.
V. SPECIAL NEEDS
The special needs exception to the warrant requirement extends
the administrative search exception into the personal sphere, by
247
permitting suspicionless searches of people, not just places. Where
government can demonstrate a “special need,” searches of persons
themselves, rather than places, have been held justifiable without in248
dividualized suspicion or a warrant. The special needs line of cases
249
Although
represents a shift not merely in focus, but in doctrine.
the Court often asserts that “special needs” is a “closely guarded cate250
gory of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,” the cases make clear that suspicionless searches for special needs are no
longer exceptional.
The Supreme Court’s special needs cases most relevant here in251
volve testing a group of individuals for illegal drugs. The Court has
upheld suspicionless drug testing when required pursuant to gov-

245
246
247

248

249
250
251

Id.
Id.
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). Eve Brensike Primus traces the origins
of the special needs doctrine from what she calls searches of “special subpopulations,”
and argues that initially, courts required some generalized suspicion that members of a
subpopulation violated a civil requirement, such as a condition of employment or school
attendance. Primus, supra note 215, at 260. She distinguishes this special needs doctrine
from that originating in the cases addressing administrative or dragnet searches, and argues that courts have conflated the two lines of cases, creating doctrinal confusion and
inappropriately expanding the rationale for suspicionless searches. Id. at 260–61.
This is a far cry from the principle stated in Camara that “except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” Camara v. Municipal Court
of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967).
Primus, supra note 215, at 260.
See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
Drug tests typically entail providing a urine sample (sometimes collected under supervision) that is tested by a laboratory for the presence of specified illegal drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, marijuana, amphetamines, opiates, and barbiturates. Drug tests may also
include breathalyzer tests and blood tests.
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ernment regulation, 252 as a condition of government employment or
253
254
promotion, and participation in public school activities. Initially,
justification for testing was grounded in the fact that the persons tested were in safety sensitive positions, who could endanger the public if
impaired by drug use. For example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, federal regulations authorized drug testing of railroad employees after a serious accident, because impaired performance could
255
Findings of a special need to protect
cause injury to passengers.
public safety, however, have decayed from reasonable to barely plausible. In Von Raab, applicants for positions in the Customs Service
were required to pass a drug test on the theory that those who used
drugs could mishandle firearms or be subjected to bribery or extor256
A majority of Justices found this “special
tion by drug dealers.
need” sufficient, even though it was speculative and not based on any
257
suspicion of members of the applicant pool.
In Vernonia School District 47J, the Court’s majority concluded that
the school district demonstrated a special need to test students in athletic teams for drugs, because there were a few reports that athletes
might have used marijuana and athletes were seen as role models for
258
In Earls, however, it upheld
the rest of the student population.
drug testing for students in school organizations like choir, band, Academic Team, Future Farmers, and Future Homemakers—groups
that could hardly be classified as posing physical threats. Earls em252

253

254

255
256

257
258

See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding drug testing of
all railway employees involved in train accidents, when supervisors have evidence of drug
or alcohol abuse among employees, and when links between impaired employees and accidents causing substantial personal injury and financial loss have been established).
See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding drug
testing of applicants for U.S. Custom Service jobs involving drug interdiction or the carrying of a firearm).
Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002) (upholding drug testing of public school students who participate in any extracurricular school activity, including choir, band, academic teams, Future Farmers of America, and Future Homemakers of America); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995) (upholding random drug testing of students in a public school’s athletic teams,
where there was some evidence of athletes leading a drug culture).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608–11.
Id. at 668–73 (“We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction
of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty likewise have a
diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine
test.”).
Id. at 669, 679.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 662–65; see also id. at 649 (“The high school football and
wrestling coach witnessed a severe sternum injury suffered by a wrestler, and various
omissions of safety procedures and misexecutions by football players, all attributable in
his belief to the effects of drug use.”).
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phasized that both decisions granted considerable leeway to school
districts, based in part on their responsibility to protect the safety of
259
students under their supervision. In her dissenting opinion, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg challenged the factual basis for the majority’s
conclusion, saying:
Notwithstanding nightmarish images of out-of-control flatware, livestock
run amok, and colliding tubas disturbing the peace and quiet of Tecumseh, the great majority of students the School District seeks to test in
truth are engaged in activities that are not safety sensitive to an unusual
degree. There is a difference between imperfect tailoring and no tailor260
ing at all.

Nonetheless, the Court continues to insist that the special needs
261
exception remains a “closely guarded category.” In Chandler v. Miller, the Court struck down a drug testing requirement for candidates
for state political office, saying:
Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for drug testing
must be substantial—important enough to override the individual’s
acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
262
Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.

The drug testing cases, however, do not offer persuasive reasons for
finding a substantial need for testing high school band members, but
not candidates for office. The risks these two groups pose, if any, are
entirely different in scale.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, dissenting in Chandler, disputed
the notion that the special need must rise to the level of “important,”
arguing that any “proper governmental purpose other than law en263
forcement” would qualify as a special need. Vernonia and Earls suggest that the special needs analysis has collapsed into a rational basis
test, permitting suspicionless searches for almost any legitimate gov264
ernment purpose, other than law enforcement.

259
260
261

262

263
264

Id.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (“Georgia’s requirement that candidates for
state office pass a drug test, we hold, does not fit within the closely guarded category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 560
U.S. 746, 760–61 (2010); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318. The offices included “Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the superior
courts, district attorneys, members of the General Assembly, and members of the Public
Service Commission.” Id. at 309–10.
Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See generally SLOBOGIN, supra note 41; Maclin, supra note 220.
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Nevertheless, the Court has not expressly conflated its Fourth
Amendment standards with minimum scrutiny under its due process
standards of review. It continues to find that drug tests constitute
searches when required by government. The question in these cases
is whether the search was both substantively and procedurally reason265
able when conducted without individualized suspicion or a warrant.
And the key factor in this line of cases has been the importance of
the government’s purpose for a suspicionless search—whether drug
266
testing is warranted by a special need.
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court found that the special
need at issue must be the immediate purpose of the search, and not
some speculative long-term goal that the search might help to achieve
267
The Court rejected, as overreaching, the hospital’s
in the future.
argument that its goal was to help women and protect children:
While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the
women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the
immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal. . . . Because law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective,
under [hospital] respondent’s view, virtually any nonconsensual
suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than
immediate, purpose. Such an approach is inconsistent with the Fourth
268
Amendment.

Several possible conclusions may be drawn from Ferguson. The
most obvious is that law enforcement does not qualify as a special
need exception that excuses government from acting on individual269
ized suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant. A second possibility is
that consent is necessary for a search that could reveal evidence of a
crime and be reported to law enforcement. This brings us back to
265

266
267
268

269

The cases typically follow one of two paths from the Fourth Amendment’s two clauses—
those in which a warrantless search or seizure must be reasonable and those in which a
warrant is required—although the reasoning in many cases appears somewhat overlapping or inconsistent. Whether the two clauses should legitimately be considered separately and how to interpret them remains debatable. See generally Solove, supra note 45.
See, e.g., Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313–14.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001).
Id. at 68, 84. The Court also rejected law enforcement purposes as a special need in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (overturning police program of suspicionless
highway roadblocks to check vehicles for narcotics). In Edmond, the Court said that the
possibility that the roadblocks might also serve a public safety purpose by getting drunk
drivers off the road did not qualify as an independent special need that could justify a
suspicionless search. Id. at 46.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 (“[T]his case simply does not fit within the closely guarded category of ‘special needs.’”).
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the thorny question of whether consent to medical care is sufficient
to allow a third party to report the results to the police, either volun270
The Supreme Court assumed lack of
tarily or under compulsion.
271
The Fourth Circuit, on reconsent to both testing and reporting.
mand, found no consent to testing or reporting for law enforcement
272
purposes, without addressing consent to testing for medical care.
Thus, the question remains somewhat unresolved. The case can then
be seen as requiring consent to reporting only if the reports are intended for law enforcement. Would consent to reporting for a nonlaw-enforcement purpose be required in addition to consent for ordinary medical care? Ferguson offers a few hints, but no clear answer.
The Court distinguished the facts in Ferguson from its earlier drug
testing cases, as follows:
In the previous four cases, there was no misunderstanding about the
purpose of the test or the potential use of the test results, and there were
protections against the dissemination of the results to third parties. The
use of an adverse test result to disqualify one from eligibility for a particular benefit, such as a promotion or an opportunity to participate in an
extracurricular activity, involves a less serious intrusion on privacy than
the unauthorized dissemination of such results to third parties. The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic
tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent. In none of our prior cases was there
273
any intrusion upon that kind of expectation.

This language suggests that the Court saw a difference in kind between drug testing of employees and students, on one hand, and
drug testing of patients in a medical care setting, on the other. More
importantly, the Court seemed to link the testing with the reporting,
saying that medical test results, even if part of the patient’s regular
care, should not be disclosed outside the medical team without the
patient’s consent. The fact that the third-party doctrine was not even
mentioned, not even to reject it, further suggests that it is not relevant here. It might not protect the state hospital from violating the

270

271

272
273

See supra text accompanying notes 155–58; see also Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197 (3d Cir.
2010) (finding police request that hospital test patient’s blood for drugs, when patient
had been tested only for rape treatment, violated Fourth Amendment).
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85 n.24 (“But, as we have noted elsewhere, given the posture of the
case, we must assume for purposes of decision that the patients did not consent to the
searches, and we leave the question of consent for the Court of Appeals to determine.”).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 395 (4th Cir. 2002).
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). An important fact in the
prior drug testing cases was that no test results were allowed to be turned over to law enforcement authorities; they were used solely by the employer or school to determine eligibility for continued employment or team membership. Id. at 79.
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Fourth Amendment by voluntarily reporting the test results to government officials.
To be sure, the Court seemed to suggest that some uses of drug
274
It noted
test results “involve[] a less serious intrusion on privacy.”
that a search without individualized suspicion may be reasonable
when it serves an important government interest unrelated to law enforcement and the individual’s privacy interest is minimal. However,
the uses it referenced were confined to the supervisory entity—the
275
employers and schools—who ordered the tests in the first place. It
does not specifically address what special needs might justify sending
test results to a government agency unrelated to law enforcement,
such as a health or social services department.
A third possible conclusion that can be drawn from Ferguson is that
patients do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their diagnostic test results. The Court was willing to accord more weight to a patient’s medical privacy interests than to other individual interests in
privacy, at least those of employees and students. The Court characterized the invasion of privacy in Ferguson as “far more substantial”
276
Thus, it may be that the govthan in its other drug testing cases.
ernment must demonstrate more than a legitimate state interest to
qualify for a special needs exception for medical information. The
decision rests heavily on the absence of what the Court in Chandler
calls “any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from
the Fourth Amendment’s main rule” requiring individualized suspi277
cion. This suggests that the government’s “special need” must be to
274
275

276
277

Id. at 78.
Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002),
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S 656 (1989), and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) all mention
a diminished expectation of privacy on the part of those tested, as a result of employment
in a safety sensitive government position or attendance at a public school where school
officials have responsibility for the students’ safety. The Court also considered the procedural reasonableness of the testing policy, including whether the urine sample could
be produced behind closed doors, the reliability of the testing laboratory, and the opportunity to check the test results with an independent second opinion.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997). One might argue that candidates for political office would have a diminished expectation of privacy, yet the Court did not even
mention that factor. Instead, taking a cue from Justice Scalia’s dissent in Von Raab, the
Court concluded (with only Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting) that the testing primarily
served a symbolic purpose, to assure the electorate that candidates for office would be
free of the influence of drugs. Id. at 321–22. Such a purpose was clearly insufficient:
“However well meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal
privacy for a symbol’s sake. The Fourth Amendment shields society against that state action.” Id. at 322.
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prevent an identifiable, probably physical, harm, such as a train wreck
or an injury to students, that could plausibly occur if someone under
278
the influence of drugs were not excluded from participation. The
Chandler Court concluded:
[W]here the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket
suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for
example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and
other official buildings. But where, as in this case, public safety is not
genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the
279
suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.

If the special needs exception were limited to circumstances in
which individuals pose a threat to public safety, then many reporting
280
Together, Ferguson and Chanrequirements could be challenged.
dler suggest that the ultimate—and vague—goal of improving public
health in general would not qualify as a special need that justifies a
suspicionless search.
Two recent lower court cases support this conclusion. The Eleventh Circuit found that a Florida statute requiring suspicionless drug
testing of all applicants as a condition of eligibility for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) benefits violated the Fourth
281
Amendment. The court concluded that the state failed to establish
282
a special need to test all applicants without any suspicion. The state

278

279

280

281
282

The Chandler decision emphasized that the testing requirement was “not needed and
cannot work to ferret out lawbreakers,” because that goal could be accomplished with ordinary law enforcement methods, including warrants. Id. at 320. However, the Court was
far more deferential to the schools in Vernonia and Earls, despite the lack of evidence of
danger from drug use among students. In Earls, the Court emphasized the school’s “custodial and tutelary responsibility for children” as the primary legitimate basis for testing.
536 U.S. at 830. Such differences suggest an approach to drug testing that depends upon
the Court’s view of the population targeted for testing. See generally George M. Dery, III,
Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy Than Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed
the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Balancing, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 73 (1998).
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323 (citation omitted). In Von Raab, however, the Court stated that
administrative searches are intended “to prevent the development of hazardous conditions.” 489 U.S at 668. Arguably, students who used drugs could pose some danger to
their teammates and teachers during the academic year.
One might even consider that the Justices would be sensitive to the fact that their own
medical records would be reported under many reporting laws and scrutinize the need
for the information as carefully as they did in Chandler.
Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families, 772 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1364; see also Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 2000),
aff’d, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6893 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming by an equally divided en banc
panel a district court decision enjoining a Michigan statute that authorized the
suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients). The state then settled the case by agreeing to test only recipients who were reasonably suspected of using drugs. Press Release,
ACLU, Settlement Reached in ACLU Lawsuit Over Mandatory Drug Testing of Welfare Recipients

Feb. 2016]

HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY

1029

claimed that drug testing was needed to ensure that (1) beneficiaries
meet job readiness goals, (2) TANF meets child-welfare and familystability goals, and (3) public funds are not used to undermine public
283
The court disagreed. It found that, while these were “unhealth.
questionably legitimate” public concerns, “these needs are not specific to or special for TANF applicants, nor is drug testing essential to
284
ensuring the success of the TANF program as a whole.” Moreover,
they are “general concerns, proffered only at a high level of abstraction and without empirical evidence, and thus do not justify an ex285
ception to the Fourth Amendment.”
The court required a “substantial” special need—a purpose “important enough to override the individual’s acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal
286
Moreover, the state had
requirement of individualized suspicion.”
the burden of demonstrating a special need before the court needed
287
to balance that need against the privacy interest at stake.
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Florida’s alternative claim that
applicants consented to the tests. Specifically, the court confirmed
that the state cannot conduct unconstitutional drug tests “indirectly
by conditioning the receipt of this government benefit on the appli288
cant’s forced waiver of his Fourth Amendment right.” The fact that
the test was required as a condition of TANF benefits rendered it involuntary and, therefore, not a valid consent. Such a required “consent” does not render a search reasonable for purposes of the Fourth
289
Perhaps more importantly, the court made clear its
Amendment.
view that consent is not an independent justification for a special
needs search. Rather, when a government benefit is conditioned on

283

284
285

286
287
288

289

(Dec. 18, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/news/settlement-reached-aclu-michigan-lawsuitover-mandatory-drug-testing-welfare-recipients.
Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1359, 1364; see generally Brianna W. McLaughlin, Drug Testing, Welfare,
and the Special Needs Doctrine: An Argument in Support of Drug Testing TANF Recipients, 61
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 567 (2013) (arguing for suspicionless testing of all TANF applicants to
protect children and save the state money).
Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1364.
Id. The court found that the state’s interests apply generally to everyone in the state, not
only TANF applicants, but then noted that “the State does not—and cannot—claim an
entitlement to drug test all parents of all children.” Id.
Id. at 1364 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997)).
Id.; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1374; accord Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. Council 79 v.
Scott, 717 F.3d 851, 873 (11th Cir. 2013) (“In effect, the State is offering its employees
this Hobson’s choice: either they relinquish their Fourth Amendment rights and produce a urine sample which carries the potential for termination, or they accept termination immediately.”).
Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1375; Scott, 717 F.3d at 875.
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consent to drug testing, “the unconstitutional conditions inquiry is
290
Instead, the degree of volbaked into the special needs analysis.”
untariness of any consent goes to the level of the person’s expectation of privacy in the special needs analysis.
Of course, these special needs cases all concern requiring a person to take a drug test, whereas reporting laws simply require third
parties to turn over the person’s test results or other medical information to government. A district court decision that may offer some
insight into mandatory reporting laws is Oregon Prescription Drug Moni291
toring Program v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Oregon created a PDMP to help physicians and pharmacists identify drugs their
patients use for purposes of recognizing drug interactions and drug292
The state statute barred disclosures to federal,
seeking behavior.
state, and local law enforcement agencies unless they were made
“[p]ursuant to a valid court order based on probable cause” in an authorized drug-related investigation involving a person whose infor293
The state sought declaratory judgment that
mation is requested.
the Oregon statute precluded the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) from demanding PDMP data without a court order.
The DEA had repeatedly served the PDMP with administrative subpoenas seeking data about individuals, asserting that the Controlled
Substances Act authorizes it to obtain such information by subpoena
294
Importantly, the DEA relied
alone and preempts the Oregon law.
on the third-party doctrine to argue that patients have no reasonable
295
expectation of privacy in their information submitted to the PDMP.
The district court held that the patients whose data was in the
PDMP and physicians who used the PDMP for medical purposes had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescription infor296
Given this “heightened privacy interest,” the court found
mation.
that demanding the data by issuing administrative subpoenas would
297
be an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The third-party doctrine did not apply here, said the court, because
“patients and doctors are not voluntarily conveying information to
the PDMP,” and the PDMP records are “more inherently personal or
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297

Lebron, 772 F. 3d at 1376.
998 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2014).
Id. at 959–60 (noting that the PDMP recorded prescriptions for Schedules II-IV drugs
under the federal Controlled Substances Act).
Id. at 960 (quoting Or. Rev. Stat. § 431.964, § 431.966).
Id. at 961; see also 21 U.S.C. § 876.
Or. Prescription Drug Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
Id. at 964, 966.
Id. at 967.
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private” than the business records at issue in Miller and Smith v. Mary298
Accordingly, the DEA would be required to obtain a court
land.
order to obtain specific PDMP records.
VI. THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
We turn now to conceptions of reasonable expectations of privacy
in personal medical information that might warrant due process protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. State mandatory reporting laws have rarely received judicial review. The few United
States Supreme Court decisions touching the subject have granted
substantial, but not unlimited, deference to state legislatures to compel reporting of prescriptions for controlled substances (with patient
names) to deter and investigate drug crimes, and to report cases of
abortion (without patient names) for maternal health research and
statistical summaries.
Whalen v. Roe, decided in 1977, might be considered a founda299
tional case in this area. Whalen has been cited for the proposition
that the state can collect identifiable medical information for legiti300
mate purposes, using something akin to minimum scrutiny. It has
also been cited as recognizing or at least indicating that a person has
a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in his or her medi301
cal information. Neither of these propositions completely captures
the nuances in Whalen’s facts or opinion. Like Miller, Whalen offers
less guidance for contemporary data collection and use than might
be assumed.
Whalen upheld a New York state law requiring pharmacies to send
a copy of every prescription for Schedule II drugs to the state health

298

299
300

301

Id. (citing United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir.
2012)). But see State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698 (Neb. 2013) (upholding law enforcement search of a patient’s prescription records at pharmacies because patient had
no ownership or possessory interest in records); Williams v. Kentucky, 213 S.W.3d 671,
683–84 (Ky. 2006) (upholding Kentucky All-Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting
program as facially constitutional).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
See e.g., Act-Up Triangle v. Com’n for Health Serv., 483 S.E.2d 388, 395 (N.C. 1997) (upholding an AIDS reporting law that enforced the confidentiality of medical records with
criminal and civil penalties); Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio St. 3d 156, 166, 593 N.E.2d 294, 301
(Ohio 1992) (citing Whalen for proposition that privacy in prescription records is limited
to prohibiting disclosure to the public).
See, e.g., Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756–57 (2011); Big
Ridge, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm., 715 F.3d 631, 648 (7th Cir.
2013); Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).
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department. 302 The prescriptions, which included the patient’s name,
address, and age, were used to identify unlawful drug prescribing and
303
Patients and physicians
dispensing and unlawful drug diversion.
challenged the statute, claiming a right to privacy grounded in both
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments (through the Fourteenth
304
Amendment).
The Court did not discuss the Fourth Amendment, relegating the
issue to a footnote. There it rejected the challengers’ reliance on
305
306
Katz v. United States and Terry v. Ohio, saying, “those cases involve
affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy during the course of criminal investigations. We have never carried the Fourth Amendment’s interest in Privacy as far as the
307
[Whalen] appellees would have us. We decline to do so now.” The
Court’s decision in Miller, decided the year before, must have been
fresh in the Justice’s minds. Still, the Court’s footnote is puzzling,
since the prescription data were intended to be used to discover and
initiate investigations of drug-related criminal offenses, as well as violations of medical or pharmacy licensure. In this respect, they were
somewhat similar to administrative searches to which the Fourth
Amendment does apply. Perhaps the real distinction lay in the fact
that the prescriptions were collected as an ongoing program, rather
than a single, “narrowly focused intrusion.”
The challengers objected to (1) the state’s initial collection of
their identifying information, as well as (2) the possibility that their
information would be exposed to others. The Court recognized both
claims, but focused on the latter. It framed the claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment, primarily as “the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters,” which it distinguished from
the “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
308
decisions.”
302
303

304
305
306
307
308

Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593. The state sought to prevent patients from stealing prescriptions
or obtaining drugs from multiple physicians, pharmacists from improperly refilling prescriptions, and physicians from overprescribing. Id. at 592.
Id. at 598.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 n.32.
Id. at 599–600. The latter reference was to the right to privacy that includes the right to
make decisions about marriage, contraception and abortion. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497 (1965). The Court had decided Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) only four years earlier. With the contours of this right to privacy still being developed, the Court had little precedent to rely on. Later, in the abortion reporting cases, the Court seemed to find both aspects of privacy at issue, since man-
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The Court’s reasons for finding no Fourteenth Amendment violation in Whalen may not tell us much about the validity of modern
mandatory reporting laws. First, the Court found that the state protected the confidentiality of the data by keeping them on magnetic
tapes in an offline computer in a locked room and limiting the num309
That is not a realistic
ber of people authorized to access the data.
option today. Computing has changed dramatically since 1977.
Mandatory reports are increasingly sent to health departments electronically through a secure internet portal. Still, breaches remain a
310
In addition, today’s data are made available to multiple
worry.
311
Indeed, that is the purpose of creatthird parties for various uses.
ing many databases.
Second, the Court analogized the prescription law to laws requiring the reporting of venereal disease, child abuse, and deadly weapon
312
The first example enables an early response to an immewounds.
diate threat to other people. The latter two are related to investigating possible criminal offenses. The number of reporting laws has increased significantly since 1977. Most of these collect data not for
such immediate uses, but for future analysis and research. It is unlikely that the Court considered the extent to which future laws
would sweep up data for far less immediate purposes.
Third, the prescription reporting law in Whalen can be viewed as
adding a mechanism for enforcing the state’s criminal laws against
unlawful prescribing and unlawful drug use, even if the forms were

309

310

311
312

datory reporting of abortion information could chill the exercise of the right to decide to
have an abortion. Perhaps for that reason, the Court approved reporting laws that did
not include the patient’s name. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
900–01 (1992); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 765–68 (1986); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80–81 (1976).
See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605–07 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The central storage and easy
accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the
necessity of some curb on such technology.”).
See, e.g., Robert Hackett, Massive Federal Data Breach Affects 7% of Americans, TIME.COM (July 9, 2015), http://time.com/3952071/opm-data-breach-federal-employees/; U.S. Dep’t
of Health and Human Servs. Data breach results in $4.8 million HIPAA settlements, HHS Press
Office (May 7, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/05/20140507b.html;
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., WellPoint Pays HHS $1.7 Million for Leaving Information Accessible over Internet, HHS Press Office (July 11, 2013), http:/ /www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2013pres/07/20130711b.html; see also U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS Breach of Unsecured
Protected Health Information, https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf.
See supra Part II.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602 n.29.

1034

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:3

sent to the health department. 313 If so, this would suggest that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits collecting data without individualized suspicion for the purpose of future criminal investigations. The
special needs line of cases under the Fourth Amendment, however,
314
The
rejects suspicionless searches for law enforcement purposes.
315
Whalen Court dismissed the application of the Fourth Amendment,
but was writing decades before it decided the special needs, drug testing cases like Ferguson and Earls.
One distinction between these seemingly inconsistent decisions is
that the prescriptions in Whalen could be used for a few civil purposes, such as medical licensure disciplinary actions, as well as criminal
investigations. However, the New York law was enacted in response to
316
a perceived increase in drug crime and was intended to prevent
criminal offenses. Thus, another possibility is that the Court was reluctant to strike down a new initiative to attack the drug problem.
But the later drug testing programs in Ferguson, Chandler, Vernonia
and other cases were also new initiatives to prevent drug use. About
the only real distinction is that the drug testing cases involved an immediate response from the entity conducting the tests, whereas the
New York law compiled a database for future use. That is not much
of a difference. It may simply be that the Court was just beginning to
consider whether the Constitution offered any protection from government compelled data collection and was wary of opening the door
to a broad principle of privacy.
The Supreme Court has had few opportunities to explain its reasoning. Only a handful of cases concerning health data collection
reached the Court after Whalen. All those involved laws requiring
physicians or hospitals to report medical information about abortions
317
to the health department. These cases, too, offer little guidance for
analyzing modern reporting laws. First, the reporting requirement
was a relatively minor issue in cases that challenged restrictions on a
313

314
315
316
317

Id. at 603 n.30 (noting that it is “well settled that the State has broad police powers in
regulating the administration of drugs by the health professions”); see also State v. Russo,
790 A.2d 1132, 1157 (Conn. 2002) cert denied 537 U.S. 879 (2002) (describing Whalen as
not distinguishing between law enforcement and health department access to prescription records and recognizing that the New York law was passed “to prevent criminal misconduct” (emphasis in original)).
See supra Part V.
See supra text accompanying note 307.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591–92.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900–01 (1992); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765–68 (1986);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976).
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woman’s right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy and, accordingly, received little analysis. Second, while the Court recognized a right to privacy, it did not always distinguish between information privacy and the liberty interest in making decisions about
abortion.
In Danforth, the Court upheld a Missouri statute requiring abortion data reporting for the purpose of preserving “maternal health
and life by adding to the sum of medical knowledge through the
compilation of relevant maternal and health and life data and to
monitor all abortions performed to assure that they are done only
318
It conunder and in accordance with the provisions of the law.”
cluded, “Recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly
319
respect a patient’s confidentiality and privacy are permissible.”
What counts as proper respect for privacy was not explained. The
statute did not expressly require the patients’ names or other identifying information, and it limited use to “statistical purposes.” The
Court noted that the requirements were “perhaps approaching impermissible limits,” but were “not constitutionally offensive in them320
selves,” as long as they were not “abused or overdone.”
In contrast, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that did
exceed permissible limits. The law required detailed information
about abortion patients, including age, race, marital status, political
subdivision, payment method, number of prior pregnancies and gestational age, and also allowed abortion records to be “open to public
321
The Court found that three of the law’s
inspection and copying.”
characteristics “belie[d] any assertions . . . that [the state] is advanc322
ing any legitimate interest.” These were the “scope of information
required,” despite the fact that names were not required, “its availability to the public,” and the lack of limitations on how the infor323
mation could be used.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, however,
the plurality opinion seemed to favor data collection for the purpose
318
319
320
321
322
323

Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765–68.
Id. at 765.
Id.; see also id. at 766–67 (“Although the statute does not specifically require the reporting
of the woman’s name, the amount of information about her and the circumstances under
which she had an abortion are so detailed that identification is likely. . . . The ‘impermissible limits’ that Danforth mentioned and that Missouri approached have been exceeded
here.”).
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of medical research: “The collection of information with respect to
324
The statute
actual patients is a vital element of medical research.”
required reporting the physician, the facility, the referring physician
or agency, the woman’s age (but not her name), the number of prior
pregnancies and abortions, gestational age, type of abortion procedure, date of abortion, any preexisting medical conditions that could
complicate abortion, the basis for deciding whether the abortion was
medically necessary, if relevant, weight of the aborted fetus, and
whether the woman was married. In the Court’s view, the data to be
325
reported did not pose a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice.
The Court’s focus in the abortion decisions appears to be whether
the disclosure of information would chill the exercise of a constitutional right by “requiring disclosure of protected, but sometimes un326
popular, activities.” Thus, the Court paid close attention to whether a woman could be identified from the reported information.
Lower courts, however, have recognized a more specific constitu327
In
tional right to privacy in one’s personal medical information.
Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals specifically addressed information privacy separately from
the right to decide to have an abortion and also from a Fourth
328
It struck down state law provisions requiring
Amendment claim.
abortion providers to allow health department personnel access to
patient medical records (including names and addresses) and to give
fetal ultrasound prints to private contractors as violations of the pa329
Earlier, the Ninth Circuit had
tients’ right to information privacy.
held that the right to informational privacy “applies both when an
individual chooses not to disclose highly sensitive information to the
government and when an individual seeks assurance that such infor330
In Tucson Woman’s Clinic, the
mation will not be made public.”
court said, “Even if a law adequately protects against public disclosure
of a patient’s private information, it may still violate informational

324
325

326
327

328
329
330

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900–01 (1992).
The Court nevertheless struck down the requirement to report the woman’s reason for
not notifying her husband as an undue burden, because its opinion also invalidated the
statute’s provision compelling married women to notify their husbands as an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose. Id. at 901.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747; see also MARINER & ANNAS, supra note 33, at 438.
State constitutions also protect privacy, often more explicitly than the federal constitution. See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994) (medical records).
Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 371 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Planned Parenthood v. Lawall (Lawal II), 307 F.3d 783, 798–90 (9th Cir. 2002).
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privacy rights if an unbounded, large number of government em331
ployees have access to the information.” The court found that the
state had little, if any, need for much of the information sought; most
of the information bore no relation to patient health or safety.
Outside the context of mandatory reporting laws, federal courts of
appeal have recognized Fourteenth Amendment protection for a
person’s privacy interest in personal medical information and from
332
involuntary disclosure to state and federal agencies. Many of these
331
332

Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 371 F.3d at 1193 (emphasis in original).
See Moore v. Prevo, 379 F. App’x 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that prisoners have a
“Fourteenth Amendment privacy interest in guarding against disclosure of sensitive medical information from other inmates”); O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir.
2005) (psychiatric records); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (inmate’s HIV
status); Livsey v. Salt Lake Cnty., 275 F.3d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that if information is “highly personal or intimate,” like sexual medical information, an individual’s
expectation of privacy is legitimate); Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d
Cir. 2000) (sexual orientation); Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2000)
(minor student’s pregnancy status); Denuis v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he right clearly covers medical records and communications.”); Herring v. Keenan,
218 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 96 (2001) (medical information); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The right not to have intimate facts concerning one’s life disclosed without one’s consent” is “a venerable [right]
whose constitutional significance we have recognized in the past.”) (citing Paul P. v.
Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 401–02 (3d Cir. 1999)); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d
Cir. 1999) (transexualism); Doe v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d
Cir. 1995) (public employee’s “medical prescription record is . . . protected by the Constitution”); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F. 3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995); Doe v. City of New York,
15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Individuals who are infected with the HIV virus clearly
possess a constitutional right to privacy regarding their condition.”); Lankford v. City of
Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that “an employee’s medical records,
which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection” (citations omitted)); A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26
F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994) (“There is no dispute that confidential medical information is entitled to constitutional privacy protection.”); Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d
1348, 1351 (8th Cir. 1993) (concerning “highly personal medical and financial information”); Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1992); Walls v. City of
Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 1990); Schaill v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Sch. Corp., 864
F.2d 1309, 1322 n.19 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding “a substantial privacy interest in the confidentiality of medical information”); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812
F.2d 105, 112–13 (3d Cir. 1987) (“The more intimate or personal the information, the
more justified is the expectation that it will not be subject to public scrutiny.” involving a
police investigator’s medical, financial and behavioral information); In re Search Warrant
(Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987) (medical records); Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 1985) (personal medical history protected from random government intrusion); Taylor v. Best, 746
F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 982 (1985); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that NIOSH could compel production of employee medical records from private corporation for investigation of employee complaints and listing criteria for disclosure); Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35,
37 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding a constitutionally protected “interest in avoiding disclosure of
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have required heightened scrutiny of laws that provide access to
333
health or sexual information. However, the cases do not necessarily
offer a coherent, overall conception of expectations of health information privacy. Rather, many appear to consider the sensitivity of
334
Mark Rothspecific information requests on a case-by-case basis.
stein has argued that a few courts appear to be narrowing constitu335
In
tional due process protection for medical information privacy.
Matson v. Board of Education, for example, a majority of judges found
no constitutional protection without a showing of “societal discrimination and intolerance against those suffering from” a particular dis336
This places a substantial burden on individuease—fibromyalgia.
als, whose primary injury is often the dignitary harm of disclosure
itself.
VII. TOWARD A MORE NUANCED VIEW OF REPORTING LAWS
The foregoing suggests that while most health-reporting laws subjected to constitutional challenge have been upheld, the cases addressing constitutional questions are limited both in number and relevance. These quasi-precedents do not fit all of today’s diverse
reporting laws. Data are sought for many different purposes—some
essential, others perhaps not. Constitutional doctrines should take

333

334

335
336

personal matters”); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (prison inmate had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his medical records and positive
HIV test, implicating sensitive information about sexual activity and drug use). But see
Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 481 (6th Cir. 1999) (refusing to extend Whalen v.
Roe beyond its facts in the absence of specific language in the Constitution defining the
right); Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); American Fed’n of
Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(doubting a constitutional right of information privacy); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080,
1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (same).
See Sheets v. Salt Lake City, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1995) (requiring a compelling
state interest require disclosure of sexual or health information); Walls v. Petersburg, 895
F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The more intimate or personal the information, the more
justified is the expectation that it will not be subject to public scrutiny.”); Fraternal Order
of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that most circuits apply an “intermediate standard of review” for most confidentiality violations and
strict scrutiny for “severe intrusions on confidentiality”).
For example, courts have allowed disclosure of prison inmates’ HIV status to prison
guards to protect the prison population in the context of diminished expectations of privacy in the institution. See, e.g., Anderson, 72 F.3d at 523; Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1501 (11th Cir. 1991).
Mark A. Rothstein, Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy in Critical Condition, 39 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 280, 280–81 (2011).
Matson v. Bd. of. Educ., City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding no
violation of any constitutional right to privacy as a result of public disclosure of public
school teacher’s fibromyalgia).
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the differences into account when determining the scope of privacy
and justifiable government uses of identifiable data for civil purposes.
Interpretations of the human right to privacy do take such differences into account. For this reason, they may offer standards against
337
which to evaluate the merits of diverse reporting laws. First, as the
High Commissioner’s Report on Privacy makes clear, the human right
to privacy embodies the core principles of legality, necessity, and
338
State interference with an individual’s “privacy,
proportionality.
339
family, home or correspondence” must first be lawful, in the sense
of duly authorized by legitimate institutions. But, proper authorization does not save a law from being arbitrary and therefore in viola340
tion of the Covenant. The Human Rights Committee explains that
to avoid arbitrariness, laws must be “in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any
341
event, reasonable in the particular circumstance.” Thus, just as U.S.
laws must not violate constitutional rights, laws in States party to the
Convention, including the United States, are bound not to contravene the human rights protected by the Convention.
The concept of necessity refers to the State’s justification for obtaining identifiable information: “public authorities should only be
able to call for such information relating to an individual’s private life
the knowledge of which is essential in the interests of society as un342
derstood under the Covenant.” This suggests a level of justification
that exceeds what might count as a legitimate state interest for due
process purposes. It is buttressed by the proportionality (or reasonableness) requirement, which implies that “any interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the

337

338
339
340
341
342

Although limited to criminal laws, the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS (3d ed. 2013)
might also serve as a partial model for government access to records for civil purposes.
The Standards categorize information held by institutional third parties as “highly private, moderately private, minimally private, or not private,” with the level of protection
decreasing protection with the degree of privacy. Id. at 19. The Standards also recognize
the ubiquity of data disclosure to third parties today. Accordingly, they recommend that
legislative authorizations to access data consider, inter alia, “the extent to which (a) the initial transfer of such information to an institutional third party is reasonably necessary to
participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or is socially beneficial.” Id. at 20.
OHCHR, Right to Privacy, supra note 14, at 49.
Id. at 55.
Human Rights Committee, supra note 20, at para. 3.
Id. at para. 4.
Id. at para. 7.
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circumstances of any given case.” 343 These principles recognize that
privacy is not a one-dimensional right, but contains components of
varying sensitivity and importance. The case-specific focus also calls
for tailoring demands for identifiable information to the importance
of the government’s need.
The Human Rights Committee also requires States to take
“[e]ffective measures . . . to ensure that information concerning a
person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not
authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and is never used for
344
purposes incompatible with the Covenant.” This is consistent with
an admonition to limit custody and use of the information collected
to those with specific authority to do so. It may limit the extent to
which identifiable data in a government database can be disclosed to
third parties for different uses than that for which it was originally
collected.
U.S. cases discussing due process protection of privacy tend to use
a balancing test that weighs the purpose of data collection against the
intrusion on a person’s privacy. While the concept of balancing
might fit the human rights framework, both sides of the scale are of345
ten stated in frustratingly general terms in U.S. case law. Purposes
are often briefly described as broad societal goals like reducing drug
346
347
abuse or medical research. No one would argue with such noble
aspirations. Yet, such goals fail to meaningfully explain the real pur348
pose for which data will be used and why the data are needed. This
makes it difficult to assess the weight of the state’s interest. The connection between data collection and these general goals is often
speculative and far in the future. For example, APCDs hope to use

343

344
345

346

347

348

Human Rights Committee, 50th Sess., Commc’n No. 488/1992: Australia 04/04/94,
CPR/C/50/D/488/1992, at 9 (Mar. 31, 1994), http: //www1.chr.up.ac.za/undp/other/
docs/caselaw15.pdf.
Human Rights Committee, supra note 20, at para. 10.
See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 106–
07 (1992) (describing how Supreme Court Justices “exaggerate the state’s interests [and]
trivialize the individual’s interests”).
See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The Court
recognizes that an individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an aspect of the right of privacy . . . but holds that in this case, any such interest has not been
seriously enough invaded by the State to require a showing that its program was indispensable to the State’s effort to control drug abuse.” (citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976) (“The statute states that the information on the forms ‘shall be confidential and shall be used only
for statistical purposes.’ The ‘records, however, may be inspected and health data acquired by local, state, or national public health officers.’”)
Mariner, supra note 73, at 383–84.
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insurance claims data to analyze the costs and outcomes of multiple
medical services in order to see which are cost-effective. At some future time, after detailed studies, a government agency or private insurer might (or might not) use the study results to alter payment
rates. An alteration might (or might not) reduce overall health care
costs. At the time of data collection, such results are aspirational and
all too often speculative.
Different problems confront the other side of the scale—
intrusions on privacy. There may be little consensus on whether the
data sought should be considered an aspect of a person’s privacy at
all. Do people reasonably expect the information to be kept private,
and is this expectation socially acceptable? If so, the inquiry proceeds
to ask whether requiring disclosure to government would cause the
individual measurable harm. In contrast to definitions of purpose,
349
privacy harms are often required to be concrete and imminent.
Dignitary harms from being required to reveal identifiable infor350
mation are rarely considered.
Paradoxically perhaps, several scholars argue that there may be
room for a more nuanced standards governing the collection of data
from third parties under the Fourth Amendment than under Fifth
351
Amendment due process doctrine. Traditionally, mandatory reporting laws have been slotted into one or more of the exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause, warrants, or
consent. When closely examined, however, that classification may not
hold for some contemporary reporting laws. Furthermore, the possi352
bility that the Supreme Court might begin to apply a mosaic theory
to define searches suggests that it may become plausible to bring
some civil reporting laws under the Fourth Amendment’s protection.

349

350

351
352

See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600–04 (“We hold that neither the immediate nor the threatened
impact of the patient-identification requirements in the New York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972 on either the reputation or the independence of patients for whom
Schedule II drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to constitute an invasion of any
right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Mariner, supra note
73, at 377–81.
But see Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (considering how women would feel if their abortion records or photos of their torsos were made publicly available even without identification).
See Henderson, supra note 146.
See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012);
see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 956
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (determining whether government behavior constitutes a
search requires considering “whether people reasonably expect that their movements will
be recorded and aggregated” in such a manner).
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The Supreme Court has grounded its conceptions of Fourth
Amendment privacy in various ways, often using a property or
boundary-based theory of privacy, while at other times expressing a
353
reasonable expectations of privacy theory. The property-based theory asks whether police (typically) have crossed over from public to
354
The reasonable expectations
private property, such as a house.
theory asks whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
355
in something, such as the contents of a telephone call or a suit356
357
case, even when the telephone or suitcase is in a public place.
While the Jones decision appeared to rely on a property-based theory
358
of trespass, Riley was concerned with the expectation of privacy in
359
The variation in rationales in these cases sugcell phone content.
gests that the Court looks not merely to a single action on the part of
government, such as viewing cell phone contents, but also considers
the government’s reason for seeking the information and the degree
to which the information sought deserves constitutional protection.
Changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine would require finding
that government demands for information from third parties constitute a search, determining whether the search requires a warrant,
360
The first isand if not, whether it is reasonable without a warrant.
sue entails express recognition that the third-party doctrine does not
apply as a blanket exception. The second and third issues are likely

353
354
355
356

357
358
359

360

See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 (1978).
See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27 (2001).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (tactile examination of bus passenger’s luggage
in overhead storage violated the Fourth Amendment). For a deeper analysis of Fourth
Amendment protections for luggage see generally Jason W. Eldridge, The Fourth Amendment: The Privacy of Overhead Luggage Compartments on Commercial Buses, 27 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 2003 (2001).
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (arguing that “the Fourth Amendment protects people not places”).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5.
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“These cases require us to decide
how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones . . . .”); United
States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy in cell phone site location information whose exposure “can convert what would
otherwise be a private event into a public one”); see also Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4
N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone data;
third-party doctrine did not apply; warrant required).
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (“Even if a warrant is not required, a
search is not beyond Fourth Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in its scope
and manner of execution.”).
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to be fact specific. 361 They would depend on both the nature of the
information sought (to evaluate its privacy quotient) and the reason
362
for seeking it. Such factual variations, however, should not pose insurmountable obstacles for the judiciary when applied to reporting
laws. Unlike cases involving criminal investigations of individuals, reporting laws offer a single reason (or state interest) for collecting a
particular category of information. Thus, there is no need to address
individual variations. Each law can be analyzed in categorical
363
terms.
Even in the absence of formal doctrinal change, some Fourth
Amendment cases use reasoning parallel to that used in due process
analyses—assessing whether government has a legitimate reason for
364
Thus,
obtaining personal information that qualifies as private.
courts have already demonstrated their capacity to perform the requisite analysis.
This does raise the question whether the tests for Fourth and Fifth
Amendment purposes are or should be considered the same or even
duplicative? Is there any meaningful difference between a due process justification and a special need for information? If there are
none, then perhaps granting Fourth Amendment protection to
health information held by third parties gains nothing for those who
seek more privacy protection.

361

362
363

364

Kerr argues for retaining a blanket third-party doctrine in order to avoid fact-specific
queries that complicate law enforcement decision-making. See generally Kerr, supra note
102.
See generally SOLOVE, supra note 30 (arguing for variation in privacy protections depending
on the type of information, its intended use, and the risk of different harms).
One might argue that the categorical nature of civil reporting laws makes data collection
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because uniform reporting
requirements limit government discretion and opportunities for abuse, such as targeting
disfavored individuals. See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (and What They Might Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933
(2016). The legislature can duly weigh the importance of the government interest
against reasonable expectations of privacy. In theory, the powerful and affluent, who are
affected along with the disadvantaged, can protect the individual’s interest in privacy
through the political process, preventing legislative overreach. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1944–46 (1995). In
practice, however, those most able to exert political influence are unlikely to be aware of
the scope of modern reporting laws or moved to engage in legislative debate. In the absence of transparency about civil reporting laws, the political process seems a weak substitute for constitutional review.
See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (“Whether a search is reasonable
[under the Fourth Amendment] ‘is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”).
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The threshold question in both lines of cases is what counts as a
reasonable expectation of privacy that society is or should be prepared to accept as reasonable. While this phrasing comes from Katz,
the same substance is used in due process cases. Fourteenth
Amendment cases support the idea that there is a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in medical information that can be
protected from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. There is nothing wrong with having two or more constitutional amendments that apply to a concept of privacy. The First Amendment can apply to issues of privacy without academic or judicial
objection that it conflicts with the application of the Fourth Amendment, for example. Therefore, there should be no impediment to
recognizing a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in identifiable health information within the meaning of several Amendments.
One possible difference between Fourth Amendment and due
process analysis is the characterization of a justifiable government
reason for obtaining personal information. Is a legitimate purpose
enough or must government offer a more important state interest?
Must the need for data to achieve that purpose be merely plausible or
based on empirical evidence? Here, there may be differences. Special needs cases like Ferguson indicate that the government cannot justify a search for law enforcement purposes, even if the long-term
purpose might be a civil benefit to society. Cases like Whalen and
Earls suggest that government can compel information for a legitimate purpose, even if the information is not actually necessary to
achieve that purpose.
The question for both Fourth Amendment and due process purposes is whether the government is justified in compelling identifiable health information about individuals. The human rights framework offers principles for refining the doctrine. Specifically, the
principles of necessity and proportionality suggest that the state’s interest be stated in specific terms, not speculative generalities, and that
interest must be “in the interests of society as understood under the
365
Covenant.” Moreover, the more sensitive the information at issue,
the more justification the state needs to obtain it without consent.
Applying the Fourth Amendment would mean that the information
warrants protection even in the hands of third parties.
Human rights principles also call for effective remedies for viola366
A Fourth Amendment remedy lies in the exclusionary rule,
tions.
365
366

Human Rights Committee, supra note 20, at para. 7.
Id. at para. 11.
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which may be sufficient in criminal cases. If the government cannot
use the tainted fruit as evidence, a criminal defendant is not harmed,
at least in theory. The exclusionary rule has limited practical applica367
As in Chandler, the
tion in the absence of a criminal prosecution.
often-sought remedy in civil cases is to strike down the law authorizing the search.
Using the human rights framework, it should be possible to categorize reporting laws on the basis of four variables: (1) the sensitivity
or expectation of privacy in the health information; (3) the degree of
importance of the government function at issue; (4) the magnitude
of the need for government to obtain the information to achieve that
government function; and (4) the need for individually identifiable
data to achieve that government function. As noted above, health information should qualify as sensitive for purposes of the first variable.
Most people have a reasonable expectation that their health information will not be used beyond their health care without their consent. Yet that expectation can be overcome for sufficient government
purposes.
The second variable focuses on the function that government is
performing, rather than a general purpose for collecting the data.
This slight shift in terminology from purpose to function is intended
to ensure specificity in the statement of a state’s interest, which will
allow meaningful assessment of its importance. Moreover, it requires
all uses of the data to be for a government function. If a government
agency expects to provide the data it collects to a third party, that
third party must also perform a government function. This would
preclude some disclosures to private researchers, but would permit
providing relevant data to other government agencies in many cases.
The third variable connects the data to the specific government
function by requiring that the data are needed to carry out a government function. This allows government to require the collection
of even sensitive data when they are truly necessary to an important
purpose of government. The last variable is a reminder that it is
identifiable information that raises privacy concerns. To the extent
that identifiable data are not necessary, personal identifiers would
not be justified.

367

But see LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 1.7(c) (describing how exclusionary rule might apply in
civil commitment proceedings); id. § 1.7(f) (describing the applicability of exclusionary
rule in various administrative proceedings).
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Different health reporting laws seek different types of health in368
Thus, the variables may carry difformation for different reasons.
ferent weights in different laws. See Table 1 below for an example of
how reporting laws might be characterized along these parameters.
Using this rubric, mandatory reporting of universal life events that
trigger rights and responsibilities of citizenship rank high. These include reports of births, marriages, divorces, and deaths. No one
would dispute the government’s function in these circumstances or
its need to identify an individual with these events. Compelled reporting by hospitals and other agencies should qualify as a civil
search that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without consent and without probable cause. The rationale is not that the records are produced or held by third parties, but that the government
has a legitimate need for identifiable data to carry out an important
government function.
Laws requiring the reporting of instances of abuse or neglect of
children and vulnerable elderly persons should also rank high, because of the immediacy of the harm and the probability of continued
risks to personal safety. Government agencies are properly charged
with protecting persons unable to protect themselves, and the identity of wrongdoers is necessary to carry out that function.
Mandatory reporting of contagious diseases and exposure to toxic
substances should also rank high. However, more nuance is needed
here. It is certainly important for public health officials to identify
the source of a dangerous, contagious disease that is spreading in an
area or likely to spread very soon. As noted in Part II, instances of
disease outbreaks or emerging epidemics are relatively rare, while the
list of reportable diseases and conditions is quite long. Today,
notifiable diseases must be reported even when the disease poses no
369
immediate threat to anyone but the patient. The reports are used
to compile statistics on the incidence and prevalence of diseases and
to conduct research on such questions as risk factors for disease. Statistical uses, while important, do not necessarily require identifiable
data and may be vulnerable to challenge.
Like notifiable disease reporting laws, contemporary newborn
screening laws apply to two categories of conditions. The state has an
interest in ensuring that treatable conditions that threaten a newborn’s ability to function normally be recognized and brought to the
family’s attention as soon as possible. However, screening for other
368
369

See supra text accompanying note 85.
See supra text accompanying notes 71–81.
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genetic anomalies only produces samples for DNA databanks that are
used for research. Research on how to prevent or treat such conditions is surely important, but it is not an important function for government. As Congress has recognized, such data collection for re370
search requires parental consent.
Reports of cases of chronic conditions are also primarily used for
research. They were originally created by hospitals to monitor the
quality of care provided by the physicians and others who practiced in
371
No one would question that use by caregivers. It is
that hospital.
the required collection by government that threatens the legitimacy
of such registries. Thus, submission of identifiable data to cancer
registries may require individual consent.
It may be justifiable for states to require the creation of registries
for uses restricted to non-government entities, such as “information
fiduciaries” like health providers. Thus, states might require hospitals to establish cancer registries for the purpose of encouraging hospitals to monitor the quality of care, without requiring any further
reporting to the state, as part of the government functions of licensing hospitals and ensuring they provide safe and effective care. Government could also require the establishment of PDMPs with access
restricted to physicians and pharmacists, as some are today. But
opening such databases to public or private research changes the
purpose of collecting the data, removes it from a government function, and undermines its justification. Allowing law enforcement access without a warrant or probable cause comes very close to what Ferguson forbids.
The same might be true for immunization registries, which can
help both physicians and patients track what immunizations patients
have received and when additional doses should be administered.
States may have an interest in monitoring whether children have received immunizations required by separate laws that are justified as a
means of protecting the public from the spread of contagious diseas370
371

See supra text accompanying note 79.
Cancer registries are the classic example, with a documented history as far back as the
late 18th Century. See RODOLFO SARACCI & CHRISTOPHER P. WILD, INTERNATIONAL
AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER: THE FIRST 50 YEARS, 1965–2015, at 106 (2015),
http://www.iarc.fr/en/publications/books/iarc50/IARC_50%20years.pdf. Data collection on the incidence and treatment of different cancers was not encouraged by governments until the early 20th Century with Connecticut and New York State leading the way
in the United States in the 1940s. Id. at 107; see also State Cancer Registry Laws and Requirements, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DERMATOLOGY (Dec. 2012), https://www.aad.org/
file%20library/global%20navigation/education%20and%20quality%20care/state%20ca
ncer%20registries/state-cancer-registries-laws-and-requirements.pdf.
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es. 372 Since states typically delegate enforcement of immunization
laws to schools by making such immunizations a condition for attending school or daycare, it is less clear that other government agencies
need or should have access to such registry data without consent.
Many health information registries serve as a repository of data for
research. A controversial example is New York City’s blood sugar reg373
The City’s health department argues that individual consent
istry.
should not be needed because that would “compromise the data
analyses that are used to assess the burden of disease, evaluate the
impact of interventions, and responsibly allocate government re374
Such arguments logically could apply to a wide range of
sources.”
personal information sought for research.
Some scholars argue that patients should not be allowed to exclude their health information from research databases that are made
375
The standard arguavailable to multiple public and private users.
ments for dispensing with consent to research are: (1) the study
sample will not be representative of the population as a whole unless
everyone is included; and (2) obtaining consent is administratively
376
The first
burdensome and adds costs to the research enterprise.
argument has always been questionable, if not pretexual. Welldesigned research rarely requires information from everyone in a
population (either of the country or of those with a particular disease
377
or exposure).
The second argument, although couched in empirical terms, implies a normative claim: it may be difficult for researchers to obtain
consent, so the data should be provided without patient consent.
Obtaining consent to any type of research (or anything at all) always
includes some administrative effort and cost, just as any other aspect
of conducting research incurs costs and administrative inconven-

372
373
374
375
376

377

See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922) (upholding mandatory immunization against
smallpox as a condition of school attendance).
See supra text accompanying notes 80–81.
Chamany et al., supra note 82, at 559.
See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 1, at 143.
See id. at 120 (noting that requiring consent would render many research projects costprohibitive); IOM RESEARCH, supra note 87, at 209–12 (noting that, in some cases, seeking individuals’ consent contributes to selection bias); see also Lawrence O. Gostin &
James G. Hodge, Personal Privacy and Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the
National Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1451–52 (2002) (arguing
that consent would hinder comprehensive data collection and add expense).
See Mark A. Rothstein & Abigail B. Shoben, Does Consent Bias Research?, 13(4) AM. J.
BIOETHICS 27, 31–32 (2013).
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ience. 378 So the second argument is really a normative claim that autonomy is a lesser value than minimizing cost and inconvenience. If
accepted, such a claim would dispense with respect for autonomy and
privacy in all circumstances involving money and effort—which
means virtually all circumstances.
379
“Privacy comes at a cost,” Chief Justice Roberts said in Riley.
When government seeks something from an individual, the Constitution requires it to pay the cost, whether by obtaining consent or
providing a sufficient justification for not doing so. Convenience is
not a sufficient justification. Like privacy, autonomy comes at a cost.
Yet no one would claim that cost should always override autonomy.
Such a principle would eviscerate such aspects of autonomy as the
380
right to refuse treatment or to participate in research. Absent special circumstances, researchers should not be able to use, for their
own research, personally identifiable information collected by a government agency, without the informed consent of the individuals involved, because they would need informed consent in the absence of
the database. The database gives them “an effort-free tool” for their
381
research.
The New York City health department made an additional argument to support its blood sugar registry. It said that even if some
people do not want to be reported and do not need services, others
do, so the possibility that some might benefit should override the ob382
This is simply an argujection of the first, perhaps larger, group.
ment for majority rule, which the Constitution is supposed to constrain. Supporters of the Registry conclude generally that “helping
vulnerable people monitor their health status and take measures to
383
Offering serreduce risk is well within the government’s power.”
vices is certainly within the government’s power and should be encouraged. But the reporting ordinance does not offer services; it only
compels the reporting of information. If one accepts the idea that a

378

379
380
381
382
383

See, e.g., Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146 (2003) (refusing to interpret a federal
statute to permit data collected for one purpose to be used for different purposes—as an
“effort-free tool”—without complying with any legal prerequisites that would exist in the
absence of the database).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
Mariner, supra note 73, at 394.
Guillen, 537 U.S. at 146.
Chamany et al., supra note 82, at 559.
Michelle M. Mello & Lawrence O. Gostin, Commentary: A Legal Perspective on Diabetes Surveillance—Privacy and the Police Power, 87 THE MILBANK QTRLY. 575, 576 (2009); see also id.
at 577 (asserting that “the state has a compelling interest in controlling the staggering
human, social, and economic burdens of diabetes”).
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state can obtain personally identifiable health information without
the person’s consent whenever it might help an agency to offer services, study a disease, plan budgets, or reduce costs, then there really
384
is no limit to the power to compel personal information of any sort.
The most credible arguments for the power to obtain identifiable
information for research without consent are still grounded in two
empirical requirements, instead of normative principles. The first is
an assurance that the study poses no risks of physical or mental harm.
Unlike research procedures that interact with the person herself, data
385
collection and analysis do not intrude on the body. To be sure, the
revelation of damaging information about a person may cause the
person emotional distress or provoke discriminatory actions against
the person. Thus, requirements for security and confidentiality are
essential: keeping the information secure against revelation outside
the research study itself; and ensuring that research results are reported without identifiers and in a manner that prevents attribution
to any individual. These are necessary elements of responsible research studies that promise confidentiality. Whether they are sufficient to convince enough people to accept laws authorizing the use of
their identifiable information for research is unclear. There may be
386
concern that databases are vulnerable to breach, despite researchers’ efforts to provide security, or that information is becoming easier
387
A rigorous survey by Harris Interactive and Alan
to re-identify.
Westin for the Institute of Medicine found a wide array of public
388
opinions. Only 1% of respondents were willing to allow researchers
384

385
386

387

388

See Mariner, supra note 81, at 149–50. The Registry ordinance was not challenged, but it
might be vulnerable to challenge. The Board of Health relied on the same law to authorize the Registry as it did to adopt the Portion Cap Rule (a.k.a. Big Gulp). The Portion
Cap Rule was struck down on the ground that the Board of Health did not have the legislative authority to issue the ordinance. See New York Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681,
701 (N.Y. 2014).
See IOM RESEARCH, supra note 87, at 91–92.
See Charles Ornstein & Annie Waldman, CVS Among Hundreds of Providers Violating HIPAA,
Review Finds, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 29, 2015), https:/ /www.bostonglobe.com/2015/
12/29/cvs-veterans-affairs-violate-federal-privacy-laws-review-finds/
HPddb5xkuRwiYETmgZKQLN/story.html; Damian Paletta, Breached Network’s Security Is
Criticized, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2015, at A1 (describing problems with federal Office of
Personnel Management’s security system, which permitted breach).
See Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 54 (May 2014), www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (“Another reality of big data is that once data is
collected, it can be very difficult to keep anonymous.”).
Alan F. Westin, How the Public Views Privacy and Health Research, 20–22 (March 2008),
http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/48/528/%20Westin%20IOM%20Srvy%20Rept
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to use their personal information without their consent, while 8%
389
were willing to give a general consent to such use. Thirty-eight percent wanted the right to consent to or refuse each use, while 13%
390
would not allow research use under any circumstances.
Most supporters of eliminating consent to health records research
assume that such research will bring a new treatment discoveries and
significant medical and social benefits. If history offers any lessons,
391
Here again, the expected benefits rethis seems a bit optimistic.
main speculative and in the future, while erosions of principles of individual autonomy, privacy, and dignity may be immediate. Others
may assume that de-identified data will be sufficient for most re392
This is also unlikely.393 Investigators prefer data with persearch.
sonal identifiers for many reasons, including comparing individual
results across databases and contacting the individuals for follow394
up.
APCDs are a good example of research databases that use individ395
It would be almost impossible to track health care
ual level data.
costs and outcomes without being able to attribute those costs and
outcomes to individual patients and physicians. Codes might be sub-

389
390
391

392
393

394

395

%2011-1107.pdf; see also Scott Hensley, Poll: Most Americans Would Share Health Data for Research, SHOTS—HEALTH NEWS FROM NPR (Jan. 9, 2015, 10:30 AM), http: //www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2015/01/09/375621393/poll-most-americans-would-share-healthdata-for-research (reporting the results of a November 2014 poll showing a decline to
53% [from 68% in an August 2014 poll] of respondents who were in favor of sharing
even data that has no identifying information, while 47% would refuse to share even
anonymous health data).
Westin, supra note 388, at 21.
Id. at 22.
See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Healthcare, 13 NEV. L.J.
722, 748–49 (2013) (discussing big data’s failure to produce significant improvements in
health care using Google Health as an example); John P. A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published
Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED. 696, 699–701 (Aug. 2005),
www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 (finding that initial studies reporting success are typically followed by later studies that fail to replicate the
original study’s findings, and suggesting reasons for this conclusion).
See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 1, at 128.
See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymizaton,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716 (2010); Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in Research?, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 9 (2010).
See, e.g., Frakt & Bagley, supra note 46, at 1880 (asserting that the identifiable data in Medicare claims are an “essential variable” for research, and “elaborate consent requirements
make it difficult or impossible to share patient data related to substance-use disorders”).
APCDs also face a claim that ERISA preempts the application of state laws requiring selfinsured employee health insurance plans and their third party administrators to submit
claims data to the state APCD. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497, 508
(2d Cir. 2014) (finding ERISA preempts statute’s application to ERISA plans), cert. granted
sub nom. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015).
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stituted for patient names, but many other identifying details are
needed to draw meaningful conclusions. Given the pressing need for
controlling health care costs, it is certainly important to identify the
most cost-effective ways to provide good care. Government agencies
at the state and federal level have a legitimate interest in conducting
research to do so. But the question of principle intrudes again. The
performance of some ordinary government functions includes studies
of this sort. How might demands for individually identifiable information for research be distinguished from demands for any other
government function? In the absence of a satisfactory distinction,
laws requiring third party submission of identifiable data may be vulnerable to challenge.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Marshall wrote, the proper question is what risks people
396
Should
“should be forced to assume in a free and open society.”
people assume the risks associated with government demands for
their information, or should the Constitution place limits on those
demands? Traditionally, both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
have been interpreted as placing almost all the risk on individuals.
However, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones, Riley, and Patel have
inspired hope among scholars who argue that the Fourth Amendment should be a more robust source of information privacy protection. Moreover, international reaction to surveillance is encouraging
397
more attention to enforcing the human right of privacy.
Although this shift in outlook has focused on criminal investigations, it has implications for protecting privacy in the civil sphere. It
may inspire challenges to a number of civil laws requiring health providers and insurers to report identifiable health information to the
state. While the value of many such laws are beyond question, the rationale for their enactment no longer reflects either the specific purposes they serve in contemporary America or a coherent concept of
396
397

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See OHCHR, Right to Privacy, supra note 14, at 4–5 (discussing the right to privacy in the
context of governmental digital surveillance in the 2014 report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights); Owen Bowcott, UK-US Surveillance
Regime was Unlawful ‘For Seven Years’, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2015, 5:10 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/06/gchq-mass-internet-surveillanceunlawful-court-nsa (reporting that Great Britain’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal found
that regulations governing Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters’ access
to phone and email records intercepted by NSA violated Article 8 or 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights).
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privacy of medical information. A more nuanced approach to doctrine is in order, one that recognizes the reasonableness of expectations of privacy in health information and demands specific justification for compelling its disclosure to government in accordance with
the principles governing the human right of privacy. This approach
should distinguish important mandatory reporting laws from fishing
expeditions, allow essential data collection, and preserve constitutional protection for essential aspects of privacy.
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TABLE 1: REPORTING LAW CHARACTERISTICS
SENSITIVITY OF
HEALTH
INFORMATION

IMPORTANCE OF
GOVERNMENT
FUNCTION

MAGNITUDE OF
GOV’T NEED FOR
INFORMATION

GOV’T NEED FOR
IDENTIFIABLE
INFORMATION

Life events (birth,
death)

N

H

H

H

Abuse (children,
elderly)

M

H

H

H

Serious contagious
disease/toxic exposure

H

H

H

H

Treatable newborn
genetic condition

H

M

M

H

Controlled substances prescription registry
(PDMP)

H

L

M

M

Contagious disease
data collection

H

L

M

N

Chronic diseases
and conditions

H

L

M

N

Cancer registry

H

L

L

N

Immunization registry

L

M

L

N

Newborn anomalies research

H

N

N

N

Insurance claims
research on treatment costs

H

L

M

M

Insurance claims
research on treatment quality

H

L

N

M

H = High sensitivity; high importance; high need
M = Moderate sensitivity; moderate importance; moderate need
L = Low sensitivity; low importance; low need
N = NO sensitivity; no importance

